

POJAM HIBRIDNOG RATA

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Pregledni naučni članak

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Sažetak

U članku je izvršeno kritičko promišljanje definiranja hibridnog rata. Analiza sadržaja postojeće literature upućuje da se ova problematika razmatra na tri načina. Prvom, da je to evoluirani pojam specijalnog rata, drugom, da je ova sintagma podudarna, slična sa konceptima sukoba niskog intenziteta, rata četvrte generacije, složenog rata, asimetričnog rata, uključujući i specijalnog rata i trećem, da je to novi koncept rata. U članku se pokušava dokazati da je najprihvatljiviji prvi pristup. Pored toga, ukazano je i na značaj konceptualno-doktrinarnog određenja hibridnog rata. Između ostalog, razmatra se i praksa na primjeru primjene metoda hibridnog rata Rusije u pripremi i izvođenju agresije na Ukrajinu.

Ključne riječi: *hibridni rat, hibridne prijetnje*

1. Uvod

Za razumijevanje pojma *hibridnog rata* polazište predstavlja etimološko¹ određenje riječi hibridno. „Izraz hibrid potječe iz grčkog i znači otprilike 'djeca oholosti, bahatosti'. .. U svim modernim jezicima naziv je izgubio negativan prizvuk i danas označava samo mješavinu ili kombinaciju. Korištenjem izraza **hibrid** uz oznaku vrste ili procesa samo se naglašava da je tako dobivena cjelina rezultat spajanja dvije različite vrste ili procesa.”² Pored toga, prihvaćen je i stav da da „Riječ, kao takva, dolazi od latinskog *hybrida*.”³ „Od latinskog *ibrida* pod utjecajem starogrčkog ὕβρις (*húbris*, 'bijes').”⁴ Ta latinska riječ je imala značenje – „mješanca, osobe rođene od oca Rimljana i strane majke ili od slobodnjaka i roba.”⁵

Etimološko određenje riječi hibrid upućuje na višeznačnost te riječi. Ona se koristi u znanosti, tehnici, sportu, politici ... Kolokvijalno rečeno označava proizvod, proces koji je sastavljen od elemenata različitog podrijetla, u figurativnom smislu „ono što je sastavljeno od elemenata različitog porekla.”⁶ Primjerice, „u botanici i zoologiji *hibridom* se označava sjeme ili živo biće nastalo križanjem roditelja različitih uzgojnih linija, pasmina ili vrsta. U molekularnoj biologiji za spajanje jedne uzdužne polovine vrpce DNK ili RNK s drugom komplementarnom polovinom vrpce.”⁷ „U tehnici se općenito pod *hibridom* podrazumijeva sistem kod kojeg se kombiniraju dvije tehnologije.”⁸ U najopćijem, kolokvijalnom smislu, pod hibridom se podrazumijeva sve ono što je sastavljeno od elemenata različitog podrijetla.

U teoriji rata pod pojmom hibridni rat smatra se kombinirana uporaba konvencionalnih metoda rata i tzv. nevojnih sredstava. „Hibridni rat vojna je strategija koja sadrži elemente konvencionalnog ratovanja, nekonvencionalnog

¹ „Etimologija je grana lingvistike koja proučava podrijetlo riječi.” - <https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hibrid>;
„Lingvistička znanost koja proučava postanje, razvoj oblika i značenja riječi prema korišteni riječi” - <https://hjp.znanje.hr/>

² <https://hr.wiktionary.org/wiki/hibrid>

³ <https://hr.encyclopedia-titanica.com/significado-de-h-brido>

⁴ <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/hybrida#Latin>

⁵ Isti izvor

⁶ <https://www.opsteobrazovanje.in.rs/sta-znaci/hibrid/>

⁷ <https://hr.wiktionary.org/wiki/hibrid>

⁸ Isti izvor

ratovanja i kibernetiskog ratovanja.“⁹ To je relativno novi pojam koji u vojnoj teoriji i praksi egzistira tek od početka XXI stoljeća. U svezi njegovog definiranja stavovi vojnih stručnjaka su podijeljena na tri pristupa. Prema prvom, da je to samo evoluirani pojam specijalnog rata i prema drugom, da je blizak, sličan sa određenjem rata kao sukoba niskog intenziteta, rata četvrte generacije, složenog rata, asimetričnog rata, uključujući i specijalnog rata i trećem da je to novi koncept rata. Problemsko područje članka je ovo pitanje. Stajalište autora je ispravnost prvog spomenutog pristupa. Sukladno tome teorijsko-hipotetski okvir članka predstavljaju postulati koji dokazuju da je hibridni rat evaluirani koncept specijalnog rata. Zasniva se na analizi sadržaja relevantnih stavova vodećih svjetskih autora, kao i u zemljama regije.

Obzirom da je u regiji najdominantniji teorijski opus o ovoj tematici znanstvenika iz Srbije, kao i da se također, i u Hrvatskoj temeljito proučava. Zbog toga je najviše razmatran opus srpskih i hrvatskih autora. Pored njih, spominju se i autori iz BiH. Predmetni okvir članka su elementi koji potvrđuju spomenutu hipotezu da je hibridni rat usavršeni, modernizirani koncept specijalnog rata. Pored toga, obuhvaća i konceptualno-doktrinarno određenje hibridnog rata, kao i primjer prakse provedbe hibridnog rata. Zbog toga je članak podijeljen na tri poglavlja: 1. Pojmovno određenje hibridnog rata, 2. Konceptualno-doktrinarno određenje hibridnog rata i 3. Hibridno rusko djelovanje u pripremi i izvođenju nastavka agresije na Ukrajinu.

Teorijski cilj rada je davanje elemenata za studioznije sagledavanje fenomena hibridnog rata. Kao što je poznato, ne postoji još konsenzus o definiciji hibridnog ratovanja. Sistematizacija dosadašnjih definiranja fenomena hibridnog rata na spomenuta tri pristupa, kao i ukazivanje na njegovo konceptualno-doktrinarno određenje, može doprinijeti, stvoriti pretpostavke za preciznije definiranje ovog fenomena. Praktični cilj je također davanje elemenata za što adekvatnije donošenje konceptualno-doktrinarnih i normativnih akata u kojima se razmatra ova tematika. Isto tako, i da potakne praktičare – stručnjake da što potpunije sagledaju ovu iznimno kompleksnu problematiku.

2. Pojmovi određenja hibridnog rata

Termin rat je vremenom, od poimanja sa većim oružanim sukobom između država, počeo da se koristi i u izražavanju sukoba u drugim oblastima društvenog delovanja, uz korišćenje prideva za formiranje sintagmi – hladni rat, specijalni rat, totalni rat, višedimenzionalni, neograničeni, hibridni rat. Hibridni rat je termin čija uporaba je doživjela poseban intenzitet posljednjih nekoliko godina, a sam

⁹ https://hr.unionpedia.org/i/Konvencionalni_rat

termin se pojavio početkom 21. stoljeća. Iako je zaključak većine autora da on ne označava ništa novo u odnosu na neke druge slične pojmove, do jedinstvene ili opće prihvaćene definicije, se nije došlo. U stručnoj javnosti postoje različita mišljenja o sadržaju hibridnog rata, koriste se različiti pojmovi i termini, no ipak, može se primjetiti suglasnost oko toga da je hibridni rat kombinacija neoružanih i oružanih oblika ugrožavanja. (Cvetković, Kovač i Joksimović, 2019: 323)

Hibridni rat je možda i najširi pojam do sada, jer se sa globalizacijom i evolucija rata proširila sa bojnog polja, na kojem je taktika i asimetrija ratnih lukavstava mijenjala tokove i ishode bitaka i ratova, rastući do međunarodnih granica zatim regionalnih i na kraju globalnih, šireći se od sukoba u koje su bili uključeni samo vojnici, do granica cijelog, čak i globalnog, međunarodnog društva, i svih njegovih institucija, potencijala i resursa. (Ahić i Alishapić, 2019:163)

Kao što je već naglašeno, u svezi odnosa ovog pojma sa ranijim sličnim postoje dva stajališta. Prvo, da je to samo suvremeni naziv za stare oblike ratovanja koji su odavno poznati pod pojmom *specijalnog rata*, a koji je podrazumijevao skup organiziranih i koordiniranih političkih, diplomatskih, ekonomskih, psihološko-propagandnih, obavještajnih, podrivačkih, terorističkih, a ponekad i prikrivenih vojnih akcija i postupaka.“ (Cvrtila, 2017:1,2) I drugo, da su se kao posebno slični termini i pojmovi današnjem hibridnom ratu, do 1990. godine su se spominjali *totalni, hladni, specijalni rat, sukob niskog intenziteta*, a od 1990. i *rat 4. generacije, neograničeno ratovanje, složeni, asimetrični, neregularni rat*. (Cvetković, Kovač i Joksimović, 2019: 331)

Valjano pojmovno određenje ove sintagme trebalo bi da izražava njene suštinske i konstantne odredbe, uz navođenje i specifičnih svojstava, čije markiranje omogućava da se pojam *hibridni rat* razlikuje od drugih, sličnih koncepata. U stvari, zbog postojanja nekoliko pojmova koji su po svom sadržaju bliski sintagmi *hibridni rat*, poput *sukoba niskog intenziteta, rata četvrte generacije, složenog rata, asimetričnog rata i specijalnog rata*, detektiranje i označavanje tih specifičnih svojstava predstavlja glavni izazov prilikom definiranja *hibridnog rata*. (Vuković, 2018:12)

Više autora je analiziralo sličnosti i razlike pojma hibridnog rata i navedenih drugih sličnih. Primjerice, Ahić i Alishapić razmatraju razlike pojma hibridnog rata u odnosu na specijalni rat, sukob niskog intenziteta, rat IV generacije. (Ahić i Alishapić, 2019:165, 167)

Od svih spomenutih sintagmi po podudarnosti sa *hibridnim ratom* najviše se izdvaja *specijalni rat*. Kad se usporedi sa definicijom hibridnog ratovanja, uočavaju, vide se mnoge podudarnosti. U vrijeme hladnog rata, tzv. *specijalni rat* povezivan je primarno sa SAD, zbog toga što su one imale razvijene snage koje

su mogle da preduzimaju široke aktivnosti u društvu države koja je bila izloženu pritisku ili agresiji. Sada, Rusija koristi potpuno identične postupke definirane prije više desetljeća u SAD kombinacijom, kako se to sada kaže, *meke* moći – propagande, podržane političkim potezima svih subverzivnih aktivnosti. (Milošević,2018:72)

Pojedini autori osporavaju navedenu podudarnost s obrazloženjem da su cyber operacije *differentia specifica* za pojam *hibridnog rata* to jest ono po čemu se ovi ratovi razlikuju od sličnih pojmova poput *specijalnog rata* koji je sadržajno vrlo blizak pojmu *hibridnog rata*. (Vuković, 2018:25) Ovakvo stajalište je s pravom osporavano. Teorija da hibridni rat predstavlja nešto novo je više nego nepovijesna. Da se u određenjima hibridnog rata ne spominju cyber napadi, ovaj narativ bi se mogao primijeniti na praktično svaki rat ikad vođen. (Subotić:2018:31)

U dosadašnjoj terminologiji hibridne prijetnje¹⁰ (ili hibridni rat) su nazivani kao *specijalni rat*. Ova dva termina imaju isto značenje. U suštini su potpuno iste metode, postupci koji su provodeni u *specijalnom ratu* koji su provodile kako države NATO i VU za vrijeme tzv. hladnog rata. Jedina razlika je što je tehničko-tehnološki napredak doveo do aktualnog sveprisutnog interneta i njegove zlouporabe *cyber* djelovanjem (ratovanjem¹¹) koji se medijski naziva i ratom i kao što je već spomenuto, najprepoznatljivijim elementom hibridnih sukoba.

Visokosofisticirane informacijske tehnologije se koriste u brojnim djelatnostima, pa tako, primjerice, i u zračnom prometu kako bi osiguralo siguran, učinkovit i pouzdan zračni promet. On igra ključnu ulogu u globalnoj povezanosti i prijevozu putnika i tereta. Međutim, tehnološki napredak doprinosi povećanoj složenosti sustava, otvarajući vrata raznim izazovima i potencijalnim opasnostima. U kontekstu rastuće međusobne povezanosti i digitalizacije zrakoplovnog sektora, naglašava se rizik od kibernetičkih prijetnji u sustavima upravljanja zračnim prometom. (Prskalo, 2023: 123)

Pored navedenog, izdvajaju se psihološke operacije, provođene u *specijalnom ratu* za vrijeme hladnog rata. Razvoj interneta je doveo do stvaranja društvenih mreža koje su, između ostalog, otvorile mogućnost da se u njima provode i

¹⁰ Prema mišljenju autora pravilnija je uporaba termina *hibridne prijetnje* u odnosu na *hibridni rat*. Osnovni razlog je što se time pravi distinkcija u odnosu na pojam rata koji podrazumijeva dominantnu ulogu oružane borbe, a u hibridnim prijetnjama kojima se izazivaju hibridni sukobi (rat) ne dominira.

¹¹ „Cyber-ratovanje (ratovanje u kibernetičkom prostoru) je pojam koji označava upotrebu računala, interneta i drugih sredstava za pohranu ili širenje informacija za provođenje napada na neprijateljske informacijske sustave pomoću sredstava informatičke tehnologije.“ (https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kiberneti%C4%8Dki_rat)

psihološke operacije, znatno naprednije u odnosu na prijašnje. Emir Muhić je u članku Psihološke operacije na društvenim mrežama – primjeri, tehnike, taktike i procedure (Muhić, 2025) istražio transformaciju ratovanja i sigurnosnih sukoba pod utjecajem suvremenih tehnoloških dostignuća, s posebnim naglaskom na ulogu društvenih mreža u provođenju psiholoških operacija. U članku se analiziraju tehnike, taktike i procedure koje se koriste za oblikovanje javnog mnijenja, manipulaciju percepcijama i širenje dezinformacija putem digitalnih komunikacijskih kanala. Kroz detaljnu analizu specifičnih strategija primijenjenih na društvenim mrežama, raspravlja se i o sigurnosnim implikacijama za nacionalne institucije i demokratski poredak.

Na temelju navedenog može se zaključiti da je pojam *hibridni rat* podudaran sa *specijalnim*. Isto tako, i da ima sličnosti i sa drugim spomenutim određenjima rata ali da je najveći stupanj poduranosti sa *specijalnim ratom* te ima isto značenje. Zbog kojih je onda razloga došlo do afirmacije i neprikosnovenog primata termina *hibridni rat*? Polazni razlog treba tražiti u domeni ideologije i politike.

Termin ima svoju političku dimenziju, posebno od zaoštavanja odnosa SAD, nekih europskih zemalja i Rusije, te služi da alarmira, pre svega zapadnu javnost, kroz semantički novi izraz. Teško se može preći preko činjenice da je hibridni rat doživio svoje redizajniranje značenja a zatim i masovnu upotrebu i diskusiju upravo tada kada su se odnosi velikih sila zaoštrili i došli skoro na nivo na kojem su bili u vreme hladnog rata. Ovoga puta su se SAD i europske zemlje u NATO-u opredjelile za korišćenje drugačijeg termina.“ (Cvetković, Kovač i Joksimović, 2019: 328)

Često se naglašava da je hibridno ratovanje samo jedan novi termin koji ublažava zvučnost staroga termina *specijalni rat* koji su u vojni vokabular i praksu uveli Amerikanci u vrijeme hladnog rata. Prema jugoslavenskom Vojnom leksikonu „specijalni rat predstavlja skup organizovanih i koordiniranih političkih, diplomatskih, ekonomskih, psihološko-propagandnih, obaveštajno-subverzivnih, terorističkih, a često i vojnih akcija i postupaka.“ (Subotić:2018:29,30)

Afirmacija hibridnog rata je dovela i do preispitivanja, kritičkog promišljanja o tome da li on utječe na redefiniranje pojma rata. Od samih početaka uvođenja ovog pojma u teoriju i praksu traje rasprava o tome da li se radi o novom konceptualnom određenju rata ili je to samo evoluirani, usavršeni model rata u savremenim uvjetima koji ne dovodi u pitanje postojeće definiranje rata. U akademskoj javnosti prisutna su sporenja da li je riječ o novom pojavnom obliku rata koji je u nekim aspektima transformiran ili je riječ o staroj pojavi obogaćenoj novim terminom. (Ćurčić:2018:47)

Uvjetno rečeno, možemo da razlikujemo dvije faze razvoja koncepta hibridni rat. Prva faza rata koja je trajala od uspostavljanja koncepta hibridni rat krajem XX. stoljeća pa sve do Ukrajinske krize (ruske agresije na Ukrajinu). Druga faza razvoja koncepta hibridni rat započinje nastankom Ukrajinske krize (ruske agresije na Ukrajinu) i aneksijom Krima od strane Rusije 2014. godine i traje sve do danas. Neki autori ove dve faze razvoja nazivaju nedržavocetrični i državocetrični pristup izučavanju pojma hibridni rat, prema određenju aktera koji primjenjuju ovaj tip rata. (Ćurčić:2018:48)

Hibridno ratovanje nije revolucionaran pristup jer izučavanjem povijesti možemo identificirati veliki broj ratova koji sadržavaju elemente hibridnog rata. Međutim, iako sami čimbenici koji definiraju hibridni rat nisu novi, već su uglavnom svi već prije korišteni u nekim od povijesnih ratova, ruski hibridni model sadržava neke dosad neizučavane aspekte – velika nepredvidivost i dinamičnost i fleksibilnost u primjeni različitih čimbenika, rastuća uloga informacijskog, ekonomskog, energetskog i drugih aspekata koji u suvremenom hibridnom modelu postaju gotovo jednako (ako ne i više) važni u odnosu na klasični vojni aspekt. (Brzica, 2018:42)

Izučavanjem dostupne literature jasno je da već postoji značajan broj stranih teoretičara i vojnih analitičara koji su u svojim međunarodno priznatim knjigama i člancima obradili pojam hibridnog rata, kao što su Frank Hoffman, Karber, McCulloh, Martin van Creveld, David Kilcullen, Janis Berzins i Robert Gates. Oni su u svojim radovima koristeći različite pristupe definirali ključne čimbenike, preduvjete, faze razvoja i čimbenike hibridnog rata kao operativnog pristupa za ostvarivanje nekih ciljeva o kojima teorija hibridnog rata ne govori ništa. (Brzica, 2018:43)

Postoji niz pojmova koji se upotrebljavaju za hibridni ratni koncept: hibridni rat, hibridne prijetnje, hibridni utjecaj ili hibridni protivnik (kao i nelinearni rat, netradicionalni rat ili specijalni rat). Vojna strategija često govori o hibridnoj prijetnji, dok akademska literatura govori o hibridnom ratovanju.“ (Ahmić, Dautbegović i Korajlić, 2018:83)

Ako se u utvrđivanju njegove definicije poslužimo najvećom (i često nepravedno omalovažavanom) internet-enciklopedijom, Wikipedijom, vidjet ćemo da je hibridno ratovanje (koje se još opisuje i kao nelinearno ili specijalno ratovanje) vojna strategija koja kombinira konvencionalno, iregularno i cyber ratovanje. (Ahmić, Dautbegović i Korajlić, 2018:84)

Hibridno ratovanje (engl. Hybrid Warfare, skraćeno HW), ili kako ga Rusi nazivaju „ratovanje nove generacije“ (engl. New Generation Warfare, skraćeno NGW) , temelji se na ideji Sun Tzua da se vrhunska vještina sastoji od slamanja

protivnikovog otpora bez borbe. Upravo na tim temeljima započeli su Rusi rat u Ukrajini. (Brzica, 2018:44)

S obzirom na složenost pojave teže je dati sažetu definiciju a istovremeno obuhvatiti sve aspekte hibridnog rata. U tom smislu bi kao riješenje moglo da posluži definiranje pojma užom¹² i širom¹³ definicijom. (Cvetković, Kovač i Joksimović, 2019: 339)

3. Konceptualno-doktrinirano određenje hibridnog rata

Za razumijevanje pojma hibridnog rata od iznimne je važnosti sagledavanje njegovog određenja u konceptualno-doktrinarnim dokumentima NATO i EU. Kao što je poznato u njima je sadržana operacionalizacija postulata najviše razine odlučivanja NATO i EU u području obrane i sigurnosti kojima se određuje način uporabe sustava obrane i sigurnosti. Ovim dokumentima se definiraju temeljna načela koncepcije, doktrine i strategije obrane i sigurnosti NATO i EU. Oni su i polazišta za donošenje konceptualno-doktrinarnih dokumenata, koji se često nazivaju strateški, zemalja članica ovih organizacija. Pored toga, oni utječu i na propitivanje postavki ovih dokumenata najvažnih rivala NATO i EU – Rusije i Kine.

Strateški koncept koji su usvojili šefovi država i vlada na NATO summitu u Madridu 29.06. 2022. predstavlja polazni konceptualno-doktrinarni dokument NATO pakta. On je zamijenio prethodni Strateški koncept iz 2010. Novi koncept predstavlja temeljne postulate djelovanja da NATO „Savez ostane spreman i opremljen resursima za budućnost.“ (Uvodni dio Strateškog koncepta) Nastale vojno-političke promjene u međunarodnim odnosima su uvjetovale, između

¹² „Uža definicija pojma bi mogla da bude sledeća: Hibridni rat predstavlja sukob dve ili više država i/ili organizacija u kome one koriste političke, ekonomske, informativne i bezbednosne elemente svoje moći, da vrše neoružanu a po potrebi i oružanu agresiju, na stanovništvo i materijalne resurse protivnika, kako bi ga potčinili svojim interesima i volji.“ (Cvetković, Kovač i Joksimović, 2019: 339)

¹³ „Šira definicija hibridnog rata bi mogla da bude sledeća: Hibridni rat predstavlja višedimenzionalni sukob u kome učestvuju jedna ili više država, i/ili organizacija formiranih na političkim, ideološkim, nacionalnim ili verskim osnovama, u okviru koga najmanje jedna strana, sa strateški centralizovanog nivoa, sinhronizovano, adaptivno, prikriveno ili javno, u okviru neoružane i oružane agresije, sprovodi informaciono-psihološko-ideološke, političke, ekonomske, obaveštajno-subverzivne, informatičke, kriminalne, terorističke i vojne aktivnosti, utičući na fizičke i mentalne resurse, društvene odnose, vrednosti i interese protivnika, a radi prisiljavanja na postupanje u skladu sa svojim političkim, ekonomskim i vojnim ciljevima i interesima.“ (Cvetković, Kovač i Joksimović, 2019: 340)

ostalog, potrebu donošenja novog Strateškog koncepta. Novi koncept sadrži stajališta o odgovoru NATO saveza na brojne ugroze među kojima su potencirane i hibridne prijetnje.

„Strateški koncept je ključni dokument za Savez. Ponovno potvrđuje vrijednosti i svrhu NATO-a i daje zajedničku procjenu sigurnosnog okruženja. Također pokreće stratešku prilagodbu NATO-a i usmjerava njegov budući politički i vojni razvoj. Strateški koncept se redovito revidira i ažurira. Od kraja Hladnog rata ažuriran je otprilike svakih 10 godina kako bi se uzele u obzir promjene u globalnom sigurnosnom okruženju i kako bi se osiguralo da je Savez spreman za budućnost. Prethodni Strateški koncept usvojen je na NATO summitu u Lisabonu 2010. Novi Strateški koncept opisuje novu sigurnosnu stvarnost s kojom se suočava Savez, ponovno potvrđuje vrijednosti NATO-a i navodi ključnu svrhu NATO-a da osigura kolektivnu obranu saveznika.“¹⁴

Novi Strateški koncept razmatra problematiku hibridnog rata prilično sveobuhvatno. Analiza sadržaja novog koncepta upućuje da se ova problematika razmatra u više točaka ovog dokumenta. Dio poglavlja Strateško okruženje u točkama 7., 8. i 13. odnosi se na hibridna sredstva i metode koje provode strateški konkurenti NATO-a. U točki 7. se ne određuje na koji se to strateške konkurenti, oni se preciziraju u točkama 8 i 13. U točki 27 potpoglavlja Odvratanje i obrana poglavlja Temeljne zadaće NATO-a se najviše potencira značaj hibridnog rata. Točka 43 potpoglavlja Kooperativna sigurnost poglavlja Temeljne zadaće NATO-a razmatra partnerstvo NATO i EU na suprotstavljanju kibernetičkim i hibridnim prijetnjama i rješavanje sustavnih izazova koje NRK postavlja euroatlantskoj sigurnosti.

U točki 7 se naglašava da strateški konkurenti „Miješaju se u naše demokratske procese i institucije i ciljaju na sigurnost naših građana putem hibridnih taktika, izravno i putem posrednika.“ U točki 8 se precizira strateški konkurent. „Ruska Federacija je najznačajnija i izravna prijetnja sigurnosti saveznika te miru i stabilnosti u euroatlantskom području.“

Jasno se ukazuje da ona (Ruska Federacija) „Protiv nas i naših partnera koristi konvencionalna, cyber i hibridna sredstva.“ Uočava se da se cyber sredstva izdvajaju da nisu u okviru hibridnih, da su istog ranga. Postavlja se pitanje da li je takav pristup u suprotnosti sa prihvaćenim teorijskim odredbama – definicijama prema kojima je cyber djelovanje sastavnica hibridnog rata?

U točki 13 se jasno izražava zabrinutost i od djelovanja i od strane drugog strateški konkurenta - NRK (Narodne Republike Kina). „Zlonamjerne hibridne i cyber operacije NRK-a i njezina konfrontirajuća retorika i dezinformacije ciljaju

¹⁴ <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>

na Saveznike i štete sigurnosti Saveza.“ I u ovoj točki se uočava da su hibridne i cyber operacije istog ranga značaja. U točki 15 se naglašava da „Cyberspace je osporavan u svakom trenutku. Zlonamjerni akteri nastoje degradirati našu kritičnu infrastrukturu, ometati naše vladine službe, izvlačiti obavještajne podatke, ukrasti intelektualno vlasništvo i ometati naše vojne aktivnosti.“ U kojoj mjeri se pridaje značaj cyberspazu najviše se može uočiti u točki 25. U njoj se navodi da „Jedan ili kumulativni skup zlonamjernih cyber aktivnosti; ili neprijateljske operacije prema, iz ili unutar svemira; moglo bi doći do razine oružanog napada i može navesti Sjevernoatlantsko vijeće da se pozove na članak 5. Sjevernoatlantskog ugovora.“

Kao što je već spomenuto u točki 27 najviše se potencira značaj hibridnog rata. U njoj se naglašava da će NATO ulagati u vlastite sposobnosti pripreme, odvratanja i obrane od hibridnih taktika od strane država i nedržavnih aktera. Pored toga, posebno je važna odredba da: „Hibridne operacije protiv saveznika mogu doseći razinu oružanog napada i dovesti Sjevernoatlantsko vijeće u situaciju da se pozove na članak 5. Sjevernoatlantskog ugovora.“ Njome se nedvosmisleno jasno određuje da hibridne operacije mogu dovesti do aktivacije članka Sjevernoatlantskog ugovora kojim je određeno da se oružani napad na jednu ili više članica smatra napadom na sve, cjelokupni Savez. Ova odredba, kao i spomenuti napadi iz točke 25, između ostalog, implicira potrebu redefiniranja dosadašnjeg određenja *oružanog napada*. Isto tako, i potrebu šireg, kompleksnijeg razumijavanja članka 5. Sjevernoatlantskog ugovora.

U točki 43 se ukazuju na značaj partnerstva NATO i EU i unaprjeđenje njegove strategije. Naglašava se da NATO-EU strateško partnerstvo stvara pretpostavke za učinkovitije „suprotstavljanje kibernetičkim i hibridnim prijetnjama.“

Značaj NATO-EU strateškog partnerstva se naglašava i Strateškim kompasom za sigurnost i obranu - za Europsku uniju koja štiti svoje građane, vrijednosti i interese te doprinosi međunarodnom miru i sigurnosti (u daljem tekstu Strateški kompas EU), polaznim konceptualno-doktrinarnim dokumentom EU u oblasti obrane i sigurnosti. U uvodu se naglašava da se Strateškim kompasom utvrđuje nova djelovanja i sredstva koja omogućuju, između ostalog, „produbljivanje suradnje s partnerima, posebno s UN-om i NATO-om, kako bi se postigli zajednički ciljevi.“ Ovaj dokument ima za EU isto značenje kao što Strateški koncept ima za NATO. Njime se utvrđuje plan za jačanje sigurnosne i obrambene politike EU do 2030. „Ovim Strateškim kompasom utvrđujemo zajedničku stratešku viziju sigurnosne i obrambene politike EU-a za razdoblje od sljedećih pet do deset godina te ćemo odmah započeti s njezinom provedbom.“ (uvod) To je prvi cjeloviti konceptualno-doktrinarni dokument EU. „Ovim Strateškim kompasom utvrđujemo zajedničku stratešku viziju sigurnosne i obrambene

politike EU-a za razdoblje od sljedećih pet do deset godina te ćemo odmah započeti s njezinom provedbom.“ (Uvod Strateškog kompasa)

„Prvu verziju Strateškog kompasa visoki predstavnik podnio je u studenome 2021. na temelju prve analize prijetnji kojoj su doprinijele obavještajne službe 27 država članica EU-a i faze strukturiranog dijaloga između država članica EU-a, institucija EU-a i stručnjaka. O naknadnim verzijama raspravljalo se u veljači i ožujku 2022. kako bi se uzela u obzir rasprava država članica i Komisijin paket o obrani i svemiru od 15. veljače te najnovija međunarodna zbivanja, posebno vojna agresija Rusije na Ukrajinu. Izravno doprinosi provedbi programa iz Versaillesa.“¹⁵

U uvodnom dijelu Sažetka Europskog kompasa se naglašava – „Hibridne prijetnje sve su češće, sa sve većim učinkom.“ U točki 5 Sažetka se navodi da će se „stvoriti instrumentarij EU-a za obranu od hibridnih prijetnji koji objedinjuje različite instrumente za otkrivanje širokog raspona hibridnih prijetnji i odgovor na njih.“

U svezi cyber prijetnji one se kao i u Strateškom konceptu NATO izdvajaju iz hibridnih. U točki 6 Sažetka se navodi da će EU „dodatno razviti okvir za politiku cyber obrane EU-a kako bismo bili bolje pripremljeni i odgovorili na cyber napade.“

U potpoglavlju Povratak politike moći u multipolarnom svijetu u sukobu prvog poglavlja Svijet s kojim se suočavamo Europskog kompasa se naglašava „Oružana agresija na Ukrajinu pokazuje spremnost na upotrebu najviše razine vojne sile, neovisno o pravnim ili humanitarnim razlozima, u kombinaciji s hibridnim taktikama, cyber napadima i manipuliranjem informacijama i uplitanjem u inozemstvu, ekonomskom i energetsom prisilom i agresivnom nuklearnom retorikom.“ Opasnost od hibridnog djelovanja Rusije se prepoznaje i u potpoglavlju istog poglavlja - Naše strateško okruženje „Utjecaj snažno pogoršanog odnosa s ruskom vladom posebno je ozbiljan u mnogima od tih područja.

Ona se aktivno upliće s pomoću hibridnih taktika, čime se ugrožavaju stabilnost zemalja i njihovi demokratski procesi.“

U već spomentom potpoglavlju prvog poglavlja Strateškog kompasa spominje se i suparništvo sa Kinom. „Kina je partner za suradnju, gospodarski konkurent i sistemski suparnik.“ „Radi na ostvarenju svojih politika, među ostalim sve većom

¹⁵ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/hr/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/>

prisutnošću na moru i u svemiru te upotrebom cyber alata i primjenom hibridnih taktika“

U potpoglavlju Nove i transnacionalne prijetnje i izazovi prvog poglavlja jasno se ukazuje da „Državni i nedržavni akteri upotrebljavaju hibridne strategije, cyber napade, kampanje dezinformiranja, izravno uplitanje u naše izbore i političke procese, ekonomsku prisilu i instrumentalizaciju tokova nezakonitih migracija.“ Ova odredba je posebno značajna zbog što se njome ističe da hibridne strategije pored državnih aktera mogu provoditi i nedržavni.

Dio potpoglavlja Zajedničko djelovanje drugog poglavlja Djelovanje odnosi se na ulogu i značaj civilnih misija ZSOP, na rješavanju više sigurnosnih izaziva, uključujući i hibridne prijetnje. „Našim civilnim misijama ZSOP-a pružamo važan doprinos vladavini prava, civilnoj upravi, policiji i reformi sigurnosnog sektora u kriznim područjima. One su ključne i kao dio šireg odgovora EU-a na sigurnosne izazove potaknute nevojnim sredstvima, uključujući one povezane s nezakonitim migracijama, hibridnim prijetnjama, terorizmom, organiziranim kriminalom, radikalizacijom i nasilnim ekstremizmom.“

Citirani dio ukazuje da se hibridne prijetnje tretiraju kao dio sigurnosnih izazova potaknutih nevojnim sredstvima. Diskutabilno je izjednačavanje hibridnih prijetnji sa nezakonitim migracijama, terorizmom, organiziranim kriminalom, radikalnim i nasilnim ekstremizmom. U teoriji i praksi je poznato da spektar hibridnog djelovanja može uključivati i te navedene prijetnje. Isto tako, i da se mogu zasebno provoditi. Zbog toga, bi bilo primjerenije da su u tom kontekstu i navedene, kao samostalne i kao dio hibridnih prijetnji. Pored toga, ovaj citirani dio problematizira i pitanje da li su doista dominantne hibridne prijetnje iz „arsenala“ nevojnih sredstava. Što je s hibridnim prijetnjama iz spektra vojnog djelovanja? Da li su one manjeg značaja? Potenciranje ove dileme može isključiti jedino preciznije određenje, u citiranom dijelu, hibridnih prijetnji kao sastavnice nevojnih sredstava.

U uvodnom dijelu trećeg poglavlja Sigurnost naglašava se „Sve se više suočavamo s hibridnim prijetnjama.“ U potpoglavlju trećeg poglavlja - Hibridne prijetnje, kiberdiplomacija te inozemna manipulacija informacijama i uplitanje je najvažnije. Ono najizravnije tretira problematika hibridnih prijetnji. U njemu se precizira da će EU razviti instrumentarij EU-a za obranu od hibridnih prijetnji i timove za brzi hibridni odgovor, te time objediniti različite instrumente za otkrivanje širokog raspona hibridnih prijetnji i davanja adekvatnog odgovora na njih.

U završnom dijelu trećeg poglavlja Ciljevi potencira se integriranje alata za suzbijanje hibridnih prijetnji „Okupit ćemo svoje alate za bolje suzbijanje hibridnih prijetnji razvojem instrumentarija za obranu od hibridnih prijetnji.“

Pored toga, precizira se i vremenski period razvijanja instrumentarija za obranu od hibridnih prijetnji. „U 2022. razvit ćemo instrumentarij EU-a za obranu od hibridnih prijetnji koji bi trebao pružiti okvir za koordinirani odgovor na hibridne kampanje koje utječu na EU i njegove države članice i koji, na primjer, obuhvaća preventivne mjere i mjere suradnje, stabilnosti, ograničavanja i oporavka te kojim bi se podupirala solidarnost i uzajamna pomoć.“ Između ostalog, navodi se i da: „Preispitat će se i Priručnik EU-a za suzbijanje hibridnih prijetnji.“

Peto poglavlje Partneri - Multilateralni i regionalni partneri posvećeno je EU-NATO partnerstvu. „Strateško partnerstvo EU-a i NATO-a ključno je za našu euroatlantsku sigurnost, što se iznova pokazalo u kontekstu vojne agresije Rusije na Ukrajinu 2022. EU je i dalje u potpunosti predan daljnjem jačanju tog ključnog partnerstva i radi poticanja transatlantske veze.“ Na kraju poglavlja u dijelu Ciljevi navodi se: „Surađivat ćemo s partnerima na suzbijanju hibridnih prijetnji, dezinformacija i kibernetičkih napada. Naš pristup bit će usmjeren i na potrebu partnera za izgradnjom kapaciteta i potporom.“

Kratka analiza sadržaja odredbi o hibridnom ratu u polaznim konceptualno-doktrinarnim dokumentima NATO i EU, Strateškog koncepta NATO i Strateškog kompasa ukazuje na njihovu usaglašenost. Ova dva dokumenta su podudarna u svezi pogleda na hibridni rat. U odnosu na definiranje sadržaja hibridnog rata, kao što je u analizi ukazano, u oba dokumenta se cyber djelovanje ne tretira kao dio hibridnog djelovanja. To je u suprotnosti sa teorijskim određenjima hibridnog rata u kome je djelovanje u cyber domeni bitna sastavnica njegovog određenja. Zbog toga se postavlja pitanje: da li će ova dva dokumenta dovesti do teorijskog redefiniranja pojma hibridnog rata ili će doći do revidiranja njihovog sadržaja?

4. Hibridno Rusko djelovanje u pripremi i izvođenju nastavka agresije na Ukrajinu

Ruska agresija na Ukrajinu pokrenula je brojna vojno-politička pitanja koja uključuju sagledavanje i njihove ekonomske dimenzije. Isto tako, ova agresija (koja se u medijima često naziva i invazija) koju je izvršila Rusija 24. veljače 2022. aktualizira i brojna druga pitanja među kojima poseban značaj ima sagledavanje pitanje sagledavanje polazišta odluke za njeno pokretanje. Ova agresija je, kao što je poznato, samo nastavak rata koji je započeo 2014. i koji je rezultirao ruskom aneksijom Krima i okupacijom istočnog dijela Ukrajine i stvaranjem dvije samoproglašene tzv. narodnih republika Donjeck i Lugansk. Postavlja se pitanje na temelju kojih procjena je Rusija donijela odluku o nastavku agresije na Ukrajinu krajem veljače 2022. koja je otvorena, neskrivena za razliku od one izvršene 2014. koju je pokušavala prikriti.

Bliske povijesne činjenice upućuju na nerazumnost aktualne ruske politike da pokreće rat koji može eskalirati u svjetski. Odnosi ekonomskih, vojnih i demografskih potencijala Rusije i EU i NATO više nego jasno ukazuju na premoć Zapada. Taj paritet je jedino relativno uravnotežen u odnosu potencijala oružja za masovno uništavanje (nuklearnog, kemijskog i biološkog). Međutim, on ne može biti ishodište razumijevanja ruske politike za nastavak agresije na Ukrajinu i riskiranje eskalacije rata. Bilo bi potpuno banaliziranje i trivijaliziranje ove kompleksne problematike na svođenje razumijevanje ruske agresivne politike na oslanjanje na moć svog oružja za masovno uništavanje, prije svega nuklearnog koje se najviše naglašava. Davanje odgovora na to polazno pitanje: Koja su polazišta ruske odluke da se usudi na nastavak agresije 2022. godine na Ukrajinu koji uključuje realni rizik eskalacije rata i političko-ekonomsku konfrontaciju sa Zapadom? Kako je moguće da se Rusija odvažila na vođenje takve politike konfrontacije sa Zapadom koja ju vodi porazu? Da li je u pitanju pogreška ruskog strateškog promišljanja?

Odgovor na ovo pitanje je iznimno kompleksan, uključuje sagledavanje vojne, političke i ekonomske komponente. Sa vojnog aspekta je poznato da svaka zemlja, pa tako i Rusija u ovom slučaju, nastoji da prije početka rata sagleda svoje prednosti u odnosu na protivničke.

Mogući razlozi za donošenje ove odluke najvjerojatnije ishodište imaju u kontinuirano stvaranoj euforiji zbog dosadašnjih uspješnih rezultata provođenja imperijalne politike i stvorenoj projekciji vojno-političke moći.¹⁶ Ova problematika nije predmet ovog članka. Pored toga, prevazilazi opseg članka. Pored spomenutog kontinuiteta uspjeha vojnog angažmana koji je nesumnjivo imao polazni značaj za donošenje ruske odluke o nastavku agresije na Ukrajinu, isto tako su najvjerojatnije utjecali i postignuti rezultati tzv. *hibridnog djelovanja*. Od 1991. Rusija provodi relativno samostalne aktivnosti iz spektra *hibridnih*

¹⁶ Rusija je već u prvim godinama svog postojanja kao neovisne države poslije raspada SSSR uspjela ostvariti svoj prve uspjehe. 1992.¹⁶ – de facto okupacijom dijela Moldavije (oko 17% njenog teritorija) stvaranjem tzv. Pridnjestrovlja (Pridnjestrovska Moldavska Republika). Po osamostaljenju, poslije raspada SSSR Gruzija je također ostala bez svoje dvije regije Južne Osetije i Abhazije. Rуска pomoć je kao i slučaju Moldavije bila presudna za stvaranje tzv. Republike Južne Osetije i Republike Abhazije na teritoriju Gruzije. Poslije toga je slijedilo zatišje do otvorenog ruskog vojnog djelovanja 2008. u Gruziji koje je rezultiralo ruskim priznavanjem tzv. Republike Južne Osetije i Republike Abhazije. Nakon toga je slijedio najambiciozniji poduhvat – razmatrana agresija 2014. na Ukrajinu i njen nastavak krajem veljače 2022. Pored ove tri spomenute agresije, Rusija je više puta demonstrirala svoju vojnu moć. Po značaju i pokazanoj brutalnosti i razornosti izdvaja se vojna intervencija u Siriji. Razoreni Alep i tisuće pobijenih civila u Siriji su do nastavka agresije na Ukrajini 2022. su bili najvjerodostojniji dokazi demonstracije brutalnosti ruske vojne moći. Rusija je prezentirala svoju vojnu moć i na druge načine. Među njima, se može izdvojiti nekoliko primjera: Armenija, teritorij bivše SFRJ, Kazahstan.

prijetnji. Ove aktivnosti predstavljaju kontinuitet djelovanja, provođenja aktivnosti bivšeg SSSR protiv Zapada. U tom vremenu te aktivnosti su nazivane kao specijalni rat.

Poznati su primjeri intenzivnog djelovanja sovjetske obavještajne službe KGB u provođenju specijalnog rata za vrijeme tzv. hladnog rata. Sljednik te službe, ruska FSB je na temelju tih iskustava korištenja metoda KGB uspjela ih modernizirati i usavršiti ih i, mora se priznati, ostvariti zavidne rezultate. Nastavak ruske agresije na Ukrajinu je razotkrio samo neke najznačajnije. Među njima, po značaju se izdvajaju razmjere političke korupcije, utjecaja na izborne procese u više značajnih europskih zemalja kao rezultata ruskog subverzivnog djelovanja koji su utjecali na određivanje smjera politika tih zemalja. Ona je potpuno očita u pogledu stvaranja energetske ovisnosti od uvoza ruskog plina, nafte i ugljena. Primjerice, njemačka ovisnost od uvoza ruskog plina u iznosu od 40%, austrijska čak od 80% itd. Više je nego jasno da je Njemačka kao ekonomski vodeća zemlja Europe mogla da svoje energetske potrebe podmiri na druge načine. Nije uvažavala američka upozorenja na opasnosti vođenja te politike te je suprotno njima sa Rusijom izgradila Sjeverni tok 2 koji je trebao još više da poveća postotak njemačke ovisnosti od ruskog plina. Poznato je da nastavak ruske agresije na Ukrajinu onemogućio ostvarenje tog plana. Isto tako, je poznato i da je ovaj nastavak ruske agresije doveo i zaokreta njemačke politike prema Rusiji.

Spomenuti primjeri ruskog uspješnog vojnog angažmana u fusnoti br.16 , kao i postignuti rezultati hibridnog djelovanja su bili temelji stvaranja uvjerenja i da će nastavak agresije na Ukrajinu biti još jedan uspješni vojni angažman koji će „zasjeniti“ sve ranije. Isto tako, polazište je bilo da neće biti značajnije reakcije NATO i EU, da će ona biti na sličnoj razini kao i prije. Pri tome, ruski planeri su također, računali na dosadašnje nesuglasje stajališta u okviru samog NATO i EU, kao i između EU i SAD i na relaciji EU – NATO prema provedbi politike prema Rusiji. Razmjere globalne krize koje je izazvao nastavak ruske agresije su potaknule potpuno suprotne – integracione procese. Došlo je do jačanja kohezije NATO i afirmacije njegove uloge kao najvećeg jamstva sigurnosti, aktualno najviše europskih članica Istočne Europe od ruskih prijetnji. Najveći dokaz te afirmacije je prijam Finske i Švedske u NATO koji, kao što je poznato, još nije formalno-pravno završen.

Značajno je naglasiti da je rusko hibridno djelovanje utemeljeno i na postulatima teorije. Ona je u Rusiji razvijena, ni malo ne zaostaje u odnosu na zapadnu. Razvoj ruske teorijske misli o fenomenu hibridnog rata je uočljiv. On je evoluirao od početnog otpora ruskog vojnog establišmenta prema uporabi novog termina. U ruskoj vojnoj terminologiji je prihvaćena sintagma nelinearna vojna strategija. Ratovi u Iraku i Libiji kao i tzv. arapske revolucije utjecali su na ruske vojne krugove da usvoje koncept nelinearnog ratovanja.

Načelnik Generalštaba Oružanih snaga Rusije general Valerij Gerasimov se smatra autorom koncepta *totalnog rata*, ruske nove generacije rata koja je po njemu nazvana Gerasimljova doktrina. Ovaj koncept je po brojnim elementima podudaran sa pojmom hibridnog rata te se, u uvjetnom smislu, može smatrati njegovom ruskom inačicom. Razradio ga je 2013. godine general Gerasimov, nakon čega je objavio dokument od 2 000 stranica pod nazivom *Važnost znanosti je u predviđanju*, a dio je objavio ruski tjednik "Vojno-industrijski kurir" (Gerasimov, 2013). U radu su postavljena nova pravila ruskog vojnog djelovanja. Opravdano se smatra da objavljivanjem ovog djela – tzv. Gerasimovljeve doktrine ruska vojna strategija evaulira u nov pristup u kojem se potencira uporabu nevojnih metoda kako bi se postigli strateški i politički ciljevi.

"Važnost nevojnih sredstava u postizanju političkih i strateških ciljeva je povećana i često u učinkovitosti nadmašuje snagu oružja", 2013. u svom djelu naglašava general Gerasimov. Prevladavanjem ograničenja zbog ograničenih finansijskih sredstava, Rusija je uspjela stvoriti strategiju jačanja nevojnih metoda koje su se pokazale učinak gotovo kao i vojne. Postoje i mišljenja koja relativiziraju ovu novu doktrinu. Ona se zasnivaju na stajalištu da je ona zbroj pojmova koji proizlaze iz sovjetske strategije obogaćenih elementima totalnog rata i novom teorijom o specifičnim uvjetima ratovanja. U suštini, ovakva stajališta proizilaze iz definiranja hibridnog rata, uključujući i ovu doktrinu, kao evauliranog, moderniziranog koncepta specijalnog rata i sovjetske strategije. Time se dovodi u pitanje da li je tzv. Gerasimljova doktrina inovativni teorijski koncept. No, i pored toga, ona je afirmirana u praksi, kao najvažnijem kriteriju valorizacije teorije. Uspješnost ruskih aktivnosti, između ostalog, i na temelju ove doktrine, ukazuje da ova relativizacija nije objektivna.

Afirmaciji sintagme hibridnog rata je značajno doprinio Andrej Korybko, ruski novinar i publicista. On je *obojene revolucije* u zemljama kao što su Ukrajina, Libija, Egipat, Sirija, od kojih su neke prerasle i u oružane sukobe nedržavnih oružanih formacija protiv zvaničnih oružanih snaga tih država, nazvao kao hibridni rat koji sprovode SAD i pojedine zemlje Europe. U svojoj knjizi „Hibridni ratovi: Indirektni adaptivni pristup promeni režima“ (Korybko, 2015) je kao elemente ovakvog hibridnog rata naveo: diplomaciju, informatičke napade, ekonomski rat, informativni rat i propagandu, podrška lokalnim grupama, neregularne oružane snage (terorizam), regularne oružane snage i specijalne jedinice.

Najveći doprinos ruskom teorijskom utemeljenju hibridnog rata je dao akademik Igor Panarain. Njegovo kapitalno djelo je knjiga *Hibridni rat: teorija i praksa*.¹⁷ U ovoj knjizi su definirani, sistematizirani i razmatrani ciljevi, referentna područja,

¹⁷ Knjiga je prevedena na srpski jezik i objavljena 2019. u izdanju Vojne knjižare u Beogradu.

satavnice i vrste hibridnog rata. Pored toga, u njoj se inicira i stvaranje institucije za provedbu metoda hibridnog rata. Ova zamisao je prepoznatljiva u zadnjem, 23 poglavlju knjige – Tehnologija pobjede Rusije, potpoglavlju Hibridna ratna matrica, ili Zašto nam je potreban informativni Glavni stožer? Ne iznenađuje operacionalizacija teorijskih promišljanja akademika Panarina iznesenih u ovom poglavlju, obzirom da je on i koordinacijski stručnjak Analitičkog vijeća, važnog savjetodavnog tijela Predsjednika Ruske Federacije.

Ova knjiga predstavlja, uvjetno rečenu, nadogradnju autorovih ideja objavljenih u prethodnom djelu Hibridni rat protiv Rusije (1816-2016). Akademik Panarin je autor i knjige Hibridni rat i geopolitika, isto tako, značajnog djela koje razmatra geopolitički aspekt hibridnog rata. Opseg članka ne dopušta prikaz opusa i drugih ruskih autora. Među njima, se izdvaja knjiga A.A.Bartoša – Siva zona: kazalište hibridnog ratovanja.¹⁸

5. Zaključak

Sagledavanje dosadašnjih pristupa definiranja hibridnog rata je iznimno značajano. U dosadašnjem definiranju uočavaju se tri pristupa: prvi, da je to evoluirani pojam specijalnog rata, drugi, da je ova sintagma podudarna, slična sa konceptima sukoba niskog intenziteta, rata četvrte generacije, složenog rata, asimetričnog rata, uključujući i specijalnog rata i treći, da je to novi koncept rata. U članku se afirmira prvi pristup. Obrazloženo je da je pojam *hibridni rat* podudaran sa *specijalnim*. Isto tako, i da ima sličnosti i sa drugim spomenutim određenjima rata ali da je najveći stupanj podudarnosti sa *specijalnim ratom* te ima isto značenje. Otvoreno je i pitanje - zbog kojih je onda razloga došlo do afirmacije i neprikosnovenog primata termina *hibridni rat*? Ukazano je da polazni razlog treba tražiti u domeni ideologije i politike.

Ovaj rad nema pretenzija da afirmira odabrani pristup kao rješenje definiranja hibridnog rata. Obzirom na kompleksnost i značaj razmatrane tematike članak ima za cilj da inicira raspravu o tri navedena pristupa i da usmjeri dalja potpunija istraživanja koja bi rezultirala prihvatanjem ili odbacivanjem predloženog pristupa definiranju hibridnog rata.

Pored toga, u članku je ukazano i na značaj razmatranja odnosa teorijskog i konceptualno-doktrinarnog određenja hibridnog rata. Sukladno tome, analiziran je sadržaj odredbi o hibridnom ratu u polaznim konceptualno-doktrinarnim

¹⁸ Aleksandar Aleksandrovič Bartoš je autor i značajnih monografija “Sukobi 21. stoljeća. Hibridni rat i obojena revolucija” i “Magla hibridnog rata. Neizvjesnosti i rizici 21. stoljeća”.

dokumentima NATO i EU, Strateškog koncepta NATO i Strateškog kompasa. Obrazloženo je da su ova dva dokumenta podudarna u svezi pogleda na hibridni rat. U odnosu na definiranje sadržaja hibridnog rata, kao što je u analizi ukazano, u oba dokumenta se cyber djelovanje ne tretira kao dio hibridnog djelovanja. Ukazano je da je ovo izostavljanje u suprotnosti sa teorijskim određenjima hibridnog rata u kome je djelovanje u cyber domeni bitna sastavnica njegovog određenja.

Između ostalog, aktualizirano je i pitanje da li afirmacija teorije i prakse hibridnog rata implicira na potrebu redefiniranja dosadašnjeg teorijskog koncepta rata. Isto tako, je razmatrana praksa primjene ruskog hibridnog djelovanja u pripremi i izvršenju agresije na Ukrajinu. Na ovom primjeru koji se može uvjetno nazvati mini studija slučaja mogu se prepoznati značajna iskustva i pouke. Kritičko propitivanje ruskog hibridnog djelovanja na ovom primjeru upućuje na zaključak da doseg učinka hibridnog djelovanja ne treba precjenjivati.

Neupitan je značaj pokrenutih pitanja za dogradnju i profilaciju teorije i prakse hibridnog rata. Može se zaključiti da je ostvaren teorijski i praktični cilj članka. S teorijskog aspekta dati su elementi koji mogu doprinijeti definiranju pojma hibridnog rata. Praktični aspekt je značajan, ukazuje, kao što je već spomenuto, da ne treba precjenjivati doseg metoda hibridnog rata u praksi. On ima za cilj i da potakne stručnjake, praktičare u području obrane i sigurnosti na proučavanje temeljnih postulata hibridnog rata kako bi sa više razumijevanja mogli pratiti razvoj teorije i prakse njegove primjene.

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Review scientific article

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Anstract:

In the article, a critical consideration of the definition of hybrid war was carried out. Analysis of the content of the existing literature indicates that this issue is considered in three ways. Firstly, that it is an evolved concept of special war, secondly, that this syntagm is consistent, similar to the concepts of low-intensity conflict, fourth-generation war, complex war, asymmetric war, including special war, and thirdly, that it is a new concept of war. The article tries to prove that the first approach is the most acceptable. In addition, the significance of the conceptual-doctrinal definition of hybrid war was also pointed out. Among other things, the practice on the example of the application of Russia's hybrid war methods in the preparation and execution of aggression against Ukraine is considered.

Keywords: *hybrid war, hybrid threats*

1. Introduction

To understand the concept of hybrid war, the starting point is the etymological¹⁹ definition of the word hybrid. "The term hybrid comes from Greek and means approximately 'children of arrogance, haughtiness'. ... In all modern languages, the term has lost its negative connotation and today it only denotes a mixture or combination. Using the term hybrid with the designation of a species or process only emphasizes that the resulting whole is the result of the merging of two different species or processes."²⁰ In addition, the position is also accepted that "The word, as such, comes from the Latin *hybrida*.²¹ "From the Latin *ibrid* under the influence of the ancient Greek *ἕβρις* (*húbris*, 'rage')²². This Latin word had the meaning – "a mixed breed, a person born of a Roman father and a foreign mother or of a freeman and a slave."²³

The etymological definition of the word hybrid indicates the ambiguity of this word. It is used in science, technology, sports, politics ... Colloquially speaking, it denotes a product, a process that is composed of elements of different origin, in the figurative sense "that which is composed of elements of different origin."²⁴ For example, "in botany and zoology, a hybrid is a seed or living being created by crossing parents of different breeding lines, breeds or species. In molecular biology, for joining one longitudinal half of a DNA or RNA strand with the other complementary half of the strand."²⁵ "In technology, a hybrid generally means a system in which two technologies are combined."²⁶ In the most general, colloquial sense, a hybrid means anything that is composed of elements of different origin.

In the theory of war, the term hybrid war is considered to be the combined use of conventional methods of war and so-called non-military means. "Hybrid war is a military strategy that contains elements of conventional warfare, unconventional

¹⁹ Etymology is a branch of linguistics that studies the origin of words. "- <https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hibrid> ; "Linguistic science that studies the origin, development of the form and meaning of words according to the root of the word" - <https://hjp.znanje.hr/>

²⁰ <https://hr.wiktionary.org/wiki/hibrid>

²¹ <https://hr.encyclopedia-titanica.com/significado-de-h-brido>

²² <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/hybrida#Latin>

²³ Same source

²⁴ <https://www.opsteobrazovanje.in.rs/sta-znaci/hibrid/>

²⁵ <https://hr.wiktionary.org/wiki/hibrid>

²⁶ Same source

warfare and cyber warfare."²⁷ This is a relatively new term that has existed in military theory and practice only since the beginning of the 21st century. Regarding its definition, the positions of military experts are divided into three approaches. According to the first, that it is only an evolved concept of special war and according to the second, that it is close, similar to the definitions of war as a low-intensity conflict, fourth-generation war, complex war, asymmetric war, including special war and the third that it is a new concept of war. The problem area of the article is this issue. The author's point of view is the correctness of the first mentioned approach. Accordingly, the theoretical and hypothetical framework of the article is represented by postulates that prove that hybrid war is an evaluated concept of special war. It is based on an analysis of the content of relevant positions of leading world authors, as well as in the countries of the region.

Considering that in the region the most dominant theoretical opus on this topic is by scientists from Serbia, and that it is also thoroughly studied in Croatia. For this reason, the work of Serbian and Croatian authors is considered the most. In addition to them, authors from BiH are also mentioned. The subject frame of the article is the elements that confirm the aforementioned hypothesis that hybrid war is a perfected, modernized concept of special war. In addition, it also includes a conceptual-doctrinal definition of hybrid war, as well as an example of the practice of implementing hybrid war. For this reason, the article is divided into three chapters: 1. Conceptual definition of hybrid war, 2. Conceptual-doctrinal definition of hybrid war, and 3. Hybrid Russian action in the preparation and execution of the continuation of aggression against Ukraine.

The theoretical goal of the paper is to provide elements for a more studious observation of the hybrid war phenomenon. As is known, there is still no consensus on the definition of hybrid warfare. The systematization of the previous definitions of the phenomenon of hybrid war into the three approaches mentioned, as well as indicating its conceptual and doctrinal determination, can contribute, create assumptions for a more precise definition of this phenomenon. The practical goal is also to provide the elements for the most adequate adoption of conceptual-doctrinal and normative acts in which this topic is considered. Also, to encourage practitioners - experts to look at this extremely complex issue as fully as possible.

²⁷ https://hr.unionpedia.org/i/Konvencionalni_rat

2. Definition of hybrid war

Over time, the term war, from the notion of a larger armed conflict between states, began to be used to express conflicts in other areas of social activity, with the use of adjectives to form syntagms - cold war, special war, total war, multidimensional, unlimited, hybrid war. Hybrid war is a term whose use has experienced a special intensity in the last few years, and the term itself appeared at the beginning of the 21st century. Although the conclusion of most authors is that it does not mean anything new in relation to some other similar terms, a unique or generally accepted definition has not been reached. In the professional public, there are different opinions about the content of hybrid war, different concepts and terms are used, but nevertheless, one can notice the agreement that hybrid war is a combination of unarmed and armed forms of threat. (Cvetković, Kovač and Joksimović, 2019: 323)

Hybrid war is perhaps the broadest term so far, because with globalization and the evolution of war, it has expanded from the battlefield, where the tactics and asymmetry of war tricks changed the course and outcome of battles and wars, growing to international borders, then regional and finally global, spreading from conflicts in which only soldiers were involved, to the borders of the entire, even global, international society, and all its institutions, potential and resources. (Ahić and Alishapić, 2019:163)

As already emphasized, there are two points of view regarding the relationship of this term with earlier similar ones. First, that it is just a modern name for old forms of warfare that have long been known under the term special war, and which meant a set of organized and coordinated political, diplomatic, economic, psychological-propaganda, intelligence, subversive, terrorist, and sometimes covert military actions and procedures." (Cvrtila, 2017:1,2) And secondly, that until 1990, total, cold, special war, low-intensity conflict, and 4th generation war, unlimited warfare, complex, asymmetric, irregular war were mentioned as terms and concepts that are particularly similar to today's hybrid war. (Cvetković, Kovač and Joksimović, 2019: 331)

A valid conceptual definition of this phrase should express its essential and constant provisions, along with specifying specific properties, the marking of which enables the term hybrid war to be distinguished from other, similar concepts. In fact, due to the existence of several terms that are close to the phrase hybrid war, such as low intensity conflict, fourth generation war, complex war, asymmetric war and special war, detecting and labeling these specific characteristics is the main challenge when defining hybrid war. (Vuković, 2018:12)

Several authors have analyzed the similarities and differences between the concept of hybrid war and the aforementioned others. For example, Ahić and Alishapić consider the differences between the concept of hybrid war in relation to special war, low-intensity conflict, and IV generation war. (Ahić and Alishapić, 2019:165, 167)

Of all the mentioned syntagms, special war stands out the most in terms of compatibility with hybrid war. When compared with the definition of hybrid warfare, they observe, many similarities are visible. During the Cold War, the so-called special war was associated primarily with the USA, because they had developed forces that could undertake wide-ranging activities in the society of a state that was exposed to pressure or aggression. Now, Russia uses exactly the same procedures defined decades ago in the USA by combining, as it is now called, soft power - propaganda, supported by political moves of all subversive activities. (Milošević, 2018:72)

Some authors dispute the above coincidence with the explanation that cyber operations are *differentia specifica* for the concept of hybrid war, that is, what distinguishes these wars from similar concepts such as special war, which is very close in content to the concept of hybrid war. (Vuković, 2018:25) This point of view is rightly contested. The theory that hybrid warfare represents something new is more than ahistorical. If the definitions of hybrid warfare did not mention cyber attacks, this narrative could be applied to virtually every war ever fought. (Subotić:2018:31)

In the previous terminology, hybrid threats²⁸ (or hybrid war) were referred to as special war. These two terms have the same meaning. In essence, they are exactly the same methods, procedures that were carried out in special war, which was carried out by both NATO and VU countries during the so-called Cold War. The only difference is that technical and technological progress has led to the current ubiquitous Internet and its misuse by cyber operations (warfare²⁹), which is also called war in the media and, as already mentioned, the most recognizable element of hybrid conflicts.

Highly sophisticated information technologies are used in numerous industries, including, for example, in air transport to ensure safe, efficient and reliable air traffic. It plays a key role in global connectivity and the transport of passengers

²⁸ In the author's opinion, the term hybrid threat is more appropriate to use in relation to hybrid war. The main reason is that it distinguishes the concept of war, which implies a dominant role for armed struggle, while hybrid threats that provoke hybrid conflicts (war) do not dominate.

²⁹ "Cyber-warfare (warfare in cyberspace) is a term that denotes the use of computers, the Internet, and other means of storing or disseminating information to carry out attacks on enemy information systems using information technology." (https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kiberneti%C4%8Dki_rat)

and cargo. However, technological advances contribute to increased system complexity, opening the door to various challenges and potential dangers. In the context of increasing interconnectedness and digitalization of the aviation sector, the risk of cyber threats in air traffic management systems is highlighted. (Prskalo, 2023: 123)

In addition to the above, there are psychological operations carried out in the special war during the cold war. The development of the Internet led to the creation of spiritual networks, which, among other things, opened up the possibility of conducting psychological operations in them, significantly more advanced compared to the previous ones. In the article Psychological operations on social networks – examples, techniques, tactics and procedures (Muhić, 2025), Emir Muhić investigated the transformation of warfare and security conflicts under the influence of modern technological achievements, with special emphasis on the role of social networks in conducting psychological operations. The article analyzes the techniques, tactics and procedures used to shape public opinion, manipulate perceptions and spread misinformation through digital communication channels. Through a detailed analysis of specific strategies applied on social networks, the security implications for national institutions and the democratic order are also discussed.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the term hybrid war coincides with special war. Likewise, and that it has similarities with the other mentioned definitions of war, but that the greatest degree of agreement is with special war and has the same meaning. What are the reasons for the affirmation and indisputable primacy of the term hybrid war? The initial reason should be sought in the domain of ideology and politics.

The term has its own political dimension, especially since the tightening of relations between the USA, some European countries and Russia, and serves to alarm, primarily the Western public, through a semantically new term. It is difficult to get over the fact that the hybrid war experienced its redesigning of meaning and then its mass use and discussion exactly when the relations of the great powers intensified and reached almost the level they were at during the Cold War. This time, the USA and the European countries in NATO decided to use a different term." (Cvetković, Kovač and Joksimović, 2019: 328)

It is often emphasized that hybrid warfare is just a new term that softens the sonority of the old term special war, which was introduced into the military vocabulary and practice by the Americans during the Cold War. According to the Yugoslav Military Lexicon, "special war is a set of organized and coordinated political, diplomatic, economic, psychological-propaganda, intelligence-

subversive, terrorist, and often military actions and procedures." (Subotić:2018:29,30)

The affirmation of the hybrid war also led to a reconsideration, a critical reflection on whether it affects the redefinition of the concept of war. From the very beginning of the introduction of this term into theory and practice, there has been a debate about whether it is a new conceptual definition of war or whether it is just an evolved, perfected model of war in contemporary conditions that does not call into question the existing definition of war. There are debates in the academic public as to whether it is a new form of war that has been transformed in some aspects, or whether it is an old phenomenon enriched with a new term. (Ćurčić:2018:47)

Conditionally speaking, we can distinguish two phases of the development of the hybrid war concept. The first phase of the war, which lasted from the establishment of the hybrid war concept at the end of the 20th century until the Ukrainian crisis (Russian aggression against Ukraine). The second phase of the development of the hybrid war concept begins with the emergence of the Ukrainian crisis (Russian aggression against Ukraine) and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and continues until today. Some authors call these two phases of development non-state-centered and state-centered approaches to the study of the concept of hybrid war, according to the determination of the actors who apply this type of war. (Ćurčić:2018:48)

Hybrid warfare is not a revolutionary approach because by studying history we can identify a large number of wars that contain elements of hybrid war. However, although the factors that define hybrid war are not new, but have mostly all been used before in some of the historical wars, the Russian hybrid model contains some previously unstudied aspects – great unpredictability and dynamism and flexibility in the application of various factors, the growing role of information, economic, energy and other aspects that in the modern hybrid model become almost equally (if not more) important compared to the classic military aspect. (Brzica, 2018:42)

By studying the available literature, it is clear that there is already a significant number of foreign theoreticians and military analysts who have discussed the concept of hybrid war in their internationally recognized books and articles, such as Frank Hoffman, Karber, McCulloh, Martin van Creveld, David Kilcullen, Janis Berzins and Robert Gates. In their works, using different approaches, they defined the key factors, prerequisites, stages of development and factors of hybrid war as an operational approach to achieve some goals that the theory of hybrid war does not say anything about. (Brzica, 2018:43)

There are a number of terms used for the hybrid warfare concept: hybrid warfare, hybrid threats, hybrid influence or hybrid adversary (as well as non-linear warfare, non-traditional warfare or special warfare). Military strategy often talks about the hybrid threat, while the academic literature talks about hybrid warfare." (Ahmić, Dautbegović and Korajlić, 2018:83)

If we use the largest (and often unfairly maligned) internet encyclopedia, Wikipedia, to determine its definition, we will see that hybrid warfare (which is also described as non-linear or special warfare) is a military strategy that combines conventional, irregular and cyber warfare. (Ahmić, Dautbegović and Korajlić, 2018:84)

Hybrid warfare (eng. Hybrid Warfare, abbreviated HW), or as the Russians call it "new generation warfare" (eng. New Generation Warfare, abbreviated NGW), is based on Sun Tzu's idea that the ultimate skill consists in crushing the opponent's resistance without fighting. It was on these foundations that the Russians started the war in Ukraine. (Brzica, 2018:44)

Given the complexity of the phenomenon, it is more difficult to give a concise definition and at the same time cover all aspects of hybrid war. In this sense, a narrower³⁰ and broader³¹ definition of the term could serve as a solution. (Cvetković, Kovač and Joksimović, 2019: 339)

³⁰ "A narrower definition of the term could be the following: A hybrid war is a conflict between two or more states and/or organizations in which they use the political, economic, information and security elements of their power, to carry out unarmed and, if necessary, armed aggression, on the population and material resources of the opponent, in order to subjugate it to their interests and will." (Cvetković, Kovač and Joksimović, 2019: 339)

³¹ "A broader definition of a hybrid war could be the following: A hybrid war represents a multidimensional conflict involving one or more states and/or organizations formed on political, ideological, national or religious grounds, in which at least one side, from a strategically centralized level, synchronized, adaptive, covert or public, within the framework of unarmed and armed aggression, conducts informational-psychological-ideological, political, economic, intelligence-subversive, IT, criminal, terrorist and military activities, affecting the physical and mental resources, social relations, values and interests of the adversary, and in order to force them to act in accordance with their political, economic and military goals and interests." (Cvetković, Kovač and Joksimović, 2019: 340)

3. Conceptual-doctrinal determination od hybrid war

To understand the concept of hybrid war, it is of utmost importance to consider its definition in the conceptual and doctrinal documents of NATO and the EU. As is known, they contain the operationalization of the postulates of the highest level of decision-making of NATO and the EU in the field of defense and security, which determine the manner of using the defense and security system. These documents define the fundamental principles of the concept, doctrine and strategy of defense and security of NATO and the EU. They are also the starting points for the adoption of conceptual and doctrinal documents, which are often called strategic, by the member states of these organizations. In addition, they also influence the questioning of the positions of these documents by the most important rivals of NATO and the EU – Russia and China.

The Strategic Concept adopted by the heads of state and government at the NATO summit in Madrid on June 29, 2022, represents the initial conceptual and doctrinal document of the NATO pact. It replaced the previous Strategic Concept from 2010. The new concept represents the fundamental postulates of action so that NATO "remains ready and equipped with resources for the future." (Introductory part of the Strategic Concept) The military-political changes that have occurred in international relations have necessitated, among other things, the need to adopt a new Strategic Concept. The new concept contains positions on the NATO alliance's response to numerous threats, including hybrid threats.

“The Strategic Concept is a key document for the Alliance. It reaffirms NATO’s values and purpose and provides a common assessment of the security environment. It also drives NATO’s strategic adaptation and guides its future political and military development. The Strategic Concept is regularly reviewed and updated. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been updated approximately every 10 years to take account of changes in the global security environment and to ensure that the Alliance is future-proof. The previous Strategic Concept was adopted at the NATO Summit in Lisbon in 2010. The new Strategic Concept describes the new security reality facing the Alliance, reaffirms NATO’s values and states NATO’s core purpose of ensuring the collective defence of its Allies.”³²

The new Strategic Concept considers the issue of hybrid war quite comprehensively. Analysis of the content of the new concept indicates that this

³² <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>

issue is considered in several points of this document. Part of the Strategic Environment chapter in points 7, 8 and 13 refers to hybrid means and methods implemented by NATO's strategic competitors. Point 7 does not specify which strategic competitors they are, they are specified in points 8 and 13. In point 27 of the Deterrence and Defense subchapter of the Basic Tasks of NATO, the importance of hybrid war is emphasized the most. Item 43 of the Cooperative Security subchapter of the NATO Core Tasks chapter considers the NATO-EU partnership in countering cyber and hybrid threats and addressing the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security.

Point 7 emphasizes that strategic competitors "Interfere with our democratic processes and institutions and target the security of our citizens through hybrid tactics, directly and through intermediaries."

Point 8 specifies the strategic competitor. "The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to the security of allies and peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area." It is clearly indicated that she (the Russian Federation) "uses conventional, cyber and hybrid means against us and our partners." It can be seen that cyber assets are not classified as hybrid assets, that they are of the same rank. The question arises whether such an approach contradicts the accepted theoretical provisions - definitions according to which cyber action is a component of hybrid war?

Point 13 clearly expresses concern from the actions of another strategic competitor - the PRC (People's Republic of China). "The PRC's malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm the security of the Alliance." And at this point, it is observed that hybrid and cyber operations are of the same level of importance. Point 15 emphasizes that "Cyberspace is contested at all times. Malicious actors seek to degrade our critical infrastructure, disrupt our government services, extract intelligence, steal intellectual property, and disrupt our military activities." The extent to which the importance of cyberspace is given is best seen in point 25. It states that "A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations towards, from or within outer space; may rise to the level of an armed attack and may lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty."

As already mentioned in point 27, the importance of hybrid war is emphasized the most. It emphasizes that NATO will invest in its own capabilities to prepare, deter and defend against hybrid tactics by states and non-state actors. In addition, the provision that: "Hybrid operations against allies may reach the level of an armed attack and put the North Atlantic Council in a situation to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty" is particularly important. It unequivocally clearly

determines that hybrid operations can lead to the activation of the article of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulates that an armed attack on one or more members is considered an attack on all, the entire Alliance. This provision, as well as the aforementioned attacks from point 25, among other things, implies the need to redefine the previous definition of an armed attack. Likewise, the need for a broader, more complex understanding of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Point 43 highlights the importance of the NATO-EU partnership and the improvement of its strategy. It is emphasized that the NATO-EU strategic partnership creates the conditions for more effective "countering cyber and hybrid threats."

The importance of the NATO-EU strategic partnership is also highlighted by the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - for a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security (hereinafter referred to as the EU Strategic Compass), the EU's initial conceptual and doctrinal document in the field of defence and security. The introduction emphasises that the Strategic Compass sets out new actions and means that enable, among other things, "deepening cooperation with partners, in particular with the UN and NATO, in order to achieve common goals." This document has the same meaning for the EU as the Strategic Concept has for NATO. It sets out a plan for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy until 2030. "With this Strategic Compass, we set out a common strategic vision for the EU's security and defence policy for the next five to ten years and will begin its implementation immediately." (introduction) It is the EU's first comprehensive conceptual and doctrinal document. "With this Strategic Compass, we set out a common strategic vision for the EU's security and defence policy for the next five to ten years and will begin its implementation immediately." (Introduction to the Strategic Compass)

"The first version of the Strategic Compass was presented by the High Representative in November 2021, based on a first threat analysis contributed by the intelligence services of the 27 EU Member States and a phase of structured dialogue between EU Member States, EU institutions and experts. Subsequent versions were discussed in February and March 2022 to take into account the discussion of Member States and the Commission's defence and space package of 15 February, as well as the latest international developments, in particular

Russia's military aggression against Ukraine. It directly contributes to the implementation of the Versailles agenda."³³

The introductory part of the European Compass Executive Summary emphasizes – “Hybrid threats are becoming more frequent, with increasing impact.” Point 5 of the Executive Summary states that “an EU toolbox for defence against hybrid threats will be created that brings together different instruments to detect and respond to a wide range of hybrid threats.”

In connection with cyber threats, they are distinguished from hybrid ones, as in the Strategic Concept of NATO. Point 6 of the Summary states that the EU will “further develop the EU cyber defense policy framework so that we are better prepared and respond to cyber attacks.”

In the sub-chapter The Return of Power Politics in a Multipolar World in Conflict of the first chapter The World We Face in the European Compass it is emphasized that “The armed aggression against Ukraine demonstrates a willingness to use the highest level of military force, regardless of legal or humanitarian reasons, in combination with hybrid tactics, cyber attacks and information manipulation and interference abroad, economic and energy coercion and aggressive nuclear rhetoric.” The danger of Russia's hybrid actions is also recognized in the sub-chapter of the same chapter - Our Strategic Environment “The impact of the sharply deteriorating relationship with the Russian government is particularly serious in many of these areas. It is actively interfering using hybrid tactics, thereby jeopardizing the stability of countries and their democratic processes.”

The aforementioned sub-chapter of the first chapter of the Strategic Compass also mentions the rivalry with China. “China is a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival.” “It works to achieve its policies, including through an increasing presence at sea and in space, and through the use of cyber tools and the application of hybrid tactics.”

In the subsection New and transnational threats and challenges of the first chapter, it is clearly indicated that “State and non-state actors use hybrid strategies, cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, direct interference in our elections and political processes, economic coercion and instrumentalization of illegal migration flows.” This provision is particularly significant because it emphasizes

³³<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/hr/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/>

that hybrid strategies can be implemented by non-state actors in addition to state actors.

Part of the sub-chapter Joint action of the second chapter Action refers to the role and significance of civil missions of the CSDP, to solve multiple security challenges, including hybrid threats. "With our civilian CSDP missions, we make an important contribution to the rule of law, civil administration, policing and security sector reform in crisis areas. They are also crucial as part of the EU's broader response to security challenges driven by non-military means, including those related to illegal migration, hybrid threats, terrorism, organized crime, radicalization and violent extremism."

The quoted section indicates that hybrid threats are treated as part of security challenges driven by non-military means. Equating hybrid threats with illegal migration, terrorism, organized crime, radical and violent extremism is debatable. It is known in theory and practice that the spectrum of hybrid action can also include these mentioned threats. Also, that they can be carried out separately. For this reason, it would be more appropriate if they were listed in this context, both as independent and as part of hybrid threats. In addition, this quoted part also problematizes the question of whether hybrid threats from the "arsenal" of non-military means are really dominant. What about hybrid threats from the spectrum of military action? Are they of lesser importance? Potentiation of this dilemma can only exclude a more precise determination, in the quoted part, of hybrid threats as a component of non-military means.

In the introductory part of the third chapter, Security, it is emphasized that "We are increasingly facing hybrid threats." In the subchapter of the third chapter - Hybrid threats, cyber diplomacy and foreign manipulation of information and interference is the most important. It deals most directly with the issue of hybrid threats. It specifies that the EU will develop an EU toolkit for defense against hybrid threats and teams for a rapid hybrid response, thus unifying various instruments for detecting a wide range of hybrid threats and providing an adequate response to them.

The final part of the third chapter, Objectives, emphasizes the integration of tools for countering hybrid threats: "We will bring together our tools to better counter hybrid threats by developing a toolbox for defending against hybrid threats." In addition, the timeframe for developing the toolbox for defending against hybrid threats is specified. "In 2022, we will develop an EU toolbox for defending against hybrid threats, which should provide a framework for a coordinated response to hybrid campaigns affecting the EU and its Member States, covering, for example, preventive and cooperative measures, stability, containment and recovery, and supporting solidarity and mutual assistance." Among other things,

it states that: “The EU Handbook for Countering Hybrid Threats will also be reviewed.”

Chapter 5 Partners - Multilateral and regional partners is dedicated to the EU-NATO partnership. “The EU-NATO strategic partnership is essential for our Euro-Atlantic security, as demonstrated once again in the context of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2022. The EU remains fully committed to further strengthening this crucial partnership and to fostering the transatlantic bond.” At the end of the chapter, in the Objectives section, it states: “We will work with partners to counter hybrid threats, disinformation and cyberattacks. Our approach will also be focused on partners’ needs for capacity building and support.”

A brief analysis of the content of the provisions on hybrid warfare in the initial conceptual and doctrinal documents of NATO and the EU, the Strategic Concept of NATO and the Strategic Compass indicates their compatibility. These two documents are congruent in their view of hybrid warfare. In relation to the definition of the content of hybrid war, as indicated in the analysis, in both documents cyber action is not treated as part of hybrid action. This is in contrast to the theoretical definitions of hybrid war, in which action in the cyber domain is an essential component of its definition. Because of this, the question arises: will these two documents lead to a theoretical redefinition of the concept of hybrid war or will there be a revision of their content?

4. RUSSIAN HYBRID ACTION IN PREPARING AND CARRYING OUT CONTINUED AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has raised a number of military-political issues that include the consideration of their economic dimensions. In the same way, this aggression (which is often called an invasion in the media) carried out by Russia on February 24, 2022, also actualizes numerous other issues, among which the consideration of the starting point of the decision for its initiation is of particular importance. This aggression, as is known, is only a continuation of the war that started in 2014 and which resulted in the Russian annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the eastern part of Ukraine and the creation of two self-proclaimed so-called of the people's republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.

The question arises as to what assessments Russia based its decision to continue its aggression against Ukraine at the end of February 2022, which is open, undisguised, unlike the one carried out in 2014, which it tried to cover up.

Close historical facts point to the unreasonableness of the current Russian policy to start a war that can escalate into a world war. The relations between the

economic, military and demographic potential of Russia and the EU and NATO more than clearly indicate the supremacy of the West. This parity is only relatively balanced in relation to the potential of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological). However, it cannot be the starting point for understanding Russian policy for continuing aggression against Ukraine and risking the escalation of the war. It would be a complete banalization and trivialization of this complex issue to reduce the understanding of Russia's aggressive policy to reliance on the power of its weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear, which is emphasized the most. Answering that initial question: What are the starting points for Russia's decision to dare to continue aggression in 2022 against Ukraine, which includes the real risk of war escalation and political-economic confrontation with the West? How is it possible that Russia dared to pursue such a policy of confrontation with the West that leads it to defeat? Is this a mistake in Russian strategic thinking?

The answer to this question is extremely complex, involving consideration of military, political and economic components. From a military perspective, it is known that every country, including Russia in this case, tries to assess its advantages over its opponent before starting a war.

The possible reasons for making this decision most likely originate in the continuously created euphoria due to the successful results of implementing imperial policy and the created projection of military-political power.³⁴ This issue is not the subject of this article. Besides, it goes beyond the scope of the article.

In addition to the mentioned continuity of success of the military engagement, which undoubtedly had a starting point for the adoption of the Russian decision to continue the aggression against Ukraine, the results achieved in the so-called

³⁴ Already in the first years of its existence as an independent state after the collapse of the USSR, Russia managed to achieve its first successes. 1992 - de facto occupation of part of Moldova (about 17% of its territory) by creating the so-called Transnistria (Transnistrian Moldavian Republic). Upon independence, after the collapse of the USSR, Georgia was also left without its two regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As in the case of Moldova, Russian aid was crucial for the creation of the so-called Republic of South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia on the territory of Georgia. After that, there was a lull until the open Russian military action in 2008 in Georgia, which resulted in Russian recognition of the so-called Republic of South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia. This was followed by the most ambitious undertaking – the contemplated aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and its continuation at the end of February 2022. In addition to these three aforementioned aggressions, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its military power. The military intervention in Syria stands out in terms of significance and demonstrated brutality and destructiveness. The devastated Aleppo and thousands of killed civilians in Syria were, until the continuation of the aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the most credible evidence of the demonstration of the brutality of Russian military power. Russia has presented its military power in other ways as well. Among them, several examples can be singled out: Armenia, the territory of the former SFRY, Kazakhstan.

hybrid action. Since 1991, Russia has been conducting relatively independent activities in the spectrum of hybrid threats. These activities represent the continuity of activities, the implementation of activities of the former USSR against the West. At that time, these activities were called special war.

There are well-known examples of the intensive activities of the Soviet intelligence service KGB in conducting special warfare during the so-called Cold War. The successor of that service, the Russian FSB, based on these experiences of using KGB methods, managed to modernize and perfect them and, it must be admitted, achieve enviable results. The continuation of Russian aggression against Ukraine has exposed only some of the most significant ones. Among them, the most significant are the extent of political corruption, influence on electoral processes in several important European countries as a result of Russian subversive activities that influenced the direction of the policies of these countries. This is completely obvious in terms of creating energy dependence on imports of Russian gas, oil and coal. For example, Germany's dependence on imports of Russian gas amounts to 40%, Austria's as much as 80%, etc. It is more than clear that Germany, as the economically leading country in Europe, could have met its energy needs in other ways. It did not heed the American warnings about the dangers of pursuing that policy, and contrary to them, it built Nord Stream 2 with Russia, which was supposed to increase even more the percentage of German dependence on Russian gas. It is known that the continuation of Russian aggression against Ukraine made it impossible to realize that plan. It is also known that this continuation of Russian aggression led to a turnaround in German policy towards Russia.

The examples of successful Russian military engagement mentioned in footnote 16, as well as the achieved results of hybrid action, were the foundations for creating the belief that the continuation of the aggression against Ukraine would be another successful military engagement that would "overshadow" everything that came before. Likewise, the starting point was that there would be no significant reaction from NATO and the EU, that it would be at a similar level as before. In doing so, Russian planners also counted on the previous disagreement of positions within NATO and the EU itself, as well as between the EU and the USA and in the EU-NATO relationship regarding the implementation of policy towards Russia. The scale of the global crisis caused by the continuation of Russian aggression has stimulated completely opposite - integration processes. NATO cohesion has been strengthened and its role as the greatest guarantee of security, currently most of the European members of Eastern Europe from Russian threats, has been affirmed. The greatest evidence of this affirmation is the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, which, as is known, has not yet been formally and legally completed.

It is important to emphasize that the Russian hybrid activity is also based on the postulates of the theory. It is developed in Russia, it is not even a little behind compared to the West. The development of Russian theoretical thought about the phenomenon of hybrid war is noticeable. It evolved from the initial resistance of the Russian military establishment to the use of the new term. In Russian military terminology, the phrase non-linear military strategy is accepted. The wars in Iraq and Libya, as well as the so-called Arab revolutions influenced Russian military circles to adopt the concept of non-linear warfare.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, is considered the author of the concept of total war, the Russian new generation of war, which is named after him the Gerasimov Doctrine. This concept is similar in many elements to the concept of hybrid war and, in a conditional sense, can be considered its Russian version. It was developed by General Gerasimov in 2013, after which he published a 2,000-page document entitled *The Importance of Science in Forecasting*, part of which was published by the Russian weekly "Military-Industrial Courier" (Gerasimov, 2013). The work sets out new rules for Russian military action. It is rightly believed that with the publication of this work – the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine, Russian military strategy is evolving into a new approach that emphasizes the use of non-military methods to achieve strategic and political goals.

"The importance of non-military means in achieving political and strategic goals has increased and often exceeds the power of weapons in effectiveness," General Gerasimov emphasized in his work in 2013. Overcoming the constraints of limited financial resources, Russia has managed to create a strategy of strengthening non-military methods that have proven to be almost as effective as military ones. There are also opinions that relativize this new doctrine. They are based on the point of view that it is a sum of concepts arising from the Soviet strategy enriched with elements of total war and a new theory about the specific conditions of warfare. Essentially, these views derive from the definition of hybrid war, including this doctrine, as an evolved, modernized concept of special war and Soviet strategy. This calls into question whether the so-called The Gerasimov doctrine is an innovative theoretical concept. But, despite that, it is affirmed in practice, as the most important criterion for the valorization of the theory. The success of Russian activities, among other things, based on this doctrine, indicates that this relativization is not objective.

Andrej Koribko, a Russian journalist and publicist, contributed significantly to the affirmation of the phrase hybrid war. He called the colored revolutions in countries such as Ukraine, Libya, Egypt, Syria, some of which have turned into armed conflicts of non-state armed formations against the official armed forces of those countries, as a hybrid war conducted by the USA and certain European

countries. In his book "Hybrid Wars: An Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change" (Korybko, 2015) he listed the elements of such a hybrid war as: diplomacy, computer attacks, economic warfare, information warfare and propaganda, support for local groups, irregular armed forces (terrorism), regular armed forces and special units.

Academician Igor Panarain made the greatest contribution to the Russian theoretical foundation of hybrid war. His capital work is the book *Hybrid War: Theory and Practice*.³⁵ In this book, the objectives, reference areas, timetables and types of hybrid war are defined, systematized and considered. In addition, it initiates the creation of an institution for the implementation of hybrid war methods. This idea is recognizable in the last, 23rd chapter of the book - The technology of Russia's victory, subchapter Hybrid war matrix, or Why do we need an informative General Staff? The operationalization of academician Panarin's theoretical reflections presented in this chapter is not surprising, given that he is also a coordinating expert of the Analytical Council, an important advisory body of the President of the Russian Federation. This book is, conditionally speaking, an extension of the author's ideas published in the previous work *Hybrid War against Russia (1816-2016)*. Academician Panarin is the author of the book *Hybrid War and Geopolitics*, also a significant work that considers the geopolitical aspect of hybrid war. The scope of the article does not allow the presentation of the works of other Russian authors. Among them, the book A.A. Bartoš stands out - *Gray Zone: Theater of Hybrid Warfare*.³⁶

5. Conclusion

Looking at the previous approaches to defining hybrid war is extremely important. Three approaches can be observed in the definition so far: first, that it is an evolved concept of special war, second, that this syntagm is consistent, similar to the concepts of low-intensity conflict, fourth generation war, complex war, asymmetric war, including special war, and third, that it is a new concept of war. The article affirms the first approach. It is argued that the term hybrid war is the same as special war. Likewise, and that it has similarities with the other mentioned definitions of war, but that the greatest degree of agreement is with special war and has the same meaning. The question is also open - what are the reasons for the affirmation and indisputable primacy of the term hybrid war? It

³⁵ The book was translated into Serbian and published in 2019 by the Military Bookstore in Belgrade.

³⁶ Aleksandar Aleksandrovič Bartoš is also the author of the significant monographs "Conflicts of the 21st Century. Hybrid War and Colored Revolution" and "The Fog of Hybrid War. Uncertainties and Risks of the 21st Century".

was pointed out that the initial reason should be sought in the domain of ideology and politics.

This paper does not claim to affirm the chosen approach as a solution to defining hybrid war. Considering the complexity and significance of the discussed topic, the article aims to initiate a discussion on the three mentioned approaches and to direct further more complete research that would result in the acceptance or rejection of the proposed approach to defining hybrid war.

In addition, the article also points out the importance of considering the relationship between the theoretical and conceptual-doctrinal determination of hybrid war. Accordingly, the content of the provisions on hybrid war in the initial conceptual and doctrinal documents of NATO and the EU, the Strategic Concept of NATO and the Strategic Compass was analyzed. It is argued that these two documents are congruent regarding the view of hybrid warfare. In relation to the definition of the content of hybrid war, as indicated in the analysis, in both documents cyber action is not treated as part of hybrid action. It was pointed out that this omission is in contradiction with the theoretical definitions of hybrid war in which action in the cyber domain is an essential component of its definition.

Among other things, the question whether the affirmation of the theory and practice of hybrid war implies the need to redefine the previous theoretical concept of war was brought up to date. Likewise, the practice of applying Russian hybrid action in the preparation and execution of aggression against Ukraine was considered. On this example, which can tentatively be called a mini-case study, significant experiences and lessons can be identified. Critical questioning of the Russian hybrid action on this example leads to the conclusion that the reach of the effect of the hybrid action should not be overestimated.

The significance of the issues raised for the development and profiling of the theory and practice of hybrid war is unquestionable. It can be concluded that the theoretical and practical goal of the article has been achieved. From the theoretical aspect, the elements that can contribute to defining the concept of hybrid war are given. The practical aspect is significant, it indicates, as already mentioned, that the reach of hybrid war methods in practice should not be overestimated. It also aims to encourage experts, practitioners in the field of defense and security to study the basic postulates of hybrid war so that they can follow the development of the theory and practice of its application with greater understanding.

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