

## ISKUSTVO MEĐUNARODNIH ORGANIZACIJA U RJEŠAVANJU KONFLIKATA I IZGRADNJI MIRA NA ZAPADNOM BALKANU

*Pregledni naučni rad*

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### **Sažetak**

*Regija Zapadnog Balkana, koja obuhvata države kao što su Albanija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Kosovo, Crna Gora, Sjeverna Makedonija i Srbija, već dugo se smatra jednim od najnestabilnijih područja u Europi. Ova regija je bila poprište brojnih konflikata, posebno nakon raspada Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije početkom devedesetih godina prošlog stoljeća. Međunarodne organizacije kao što su Ujedinjene nacije, Europska unija, NATO i Organizacija za sigurnost i suradnju u Europi odigrale su ključne uloge u pokušajima rješavanja konflikata i izgradnji mira. Ovaj rad analizira njihovu ulogu, izazove s kojima su se suočavali i efikasnost njihovih intervencija u regiji.*

**Ključne riječi:** *Zapadni Balkan, Međunarodne organizacije, Rješavanje konflikata, Izgradnja mira, Efikasnost.*

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## 1. Kontekst Zapadnog Balkana

U kontekstu tradicionalno prepoznatih granica europskog kontinenta, jugoistočni dio Europe se, argumentovano, smatra najzahtjevnijim i potencijalno najproblematičnijim<sup>2</sup>.

Ovo je posebno slučaj nakon II svjetskog i Hladnog rata, a što je evidentno i kulminacijom dešavanja u regionu pred kraj 20. stoljeća.

U jugoistočnom dijelu Europe smatramo da se može napraviti ubjedljiv argument da je najproblematičniji onaj dio što se tradicionalno zove „Balkanski poluotok“<sup>3</sup>. Jednako evidentno, u kontekstu Balkanskog poluotoka posebno problematična je regija „Zapadnog Balkana“<sup>4</sup>.

Zapadni Balkan čine:

- Republika Albanija<sup>5</sup>,
- Bosna i Hercegovina,
- Republika Sjeverna Makedonija<sup>6</sup>,
- Crna Gora,
- Republika Srbija<sup>7</sup>, i
- Republika Kosovo<sup>8</sup>.

Politička situacija i karakteristike svake konstitutivne države Zapadnog Balkana se značajno razlikuju jedna od druge<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Bartlett, W. (2008): *Problematična regija Evrope: ekonomski razvoj, institucionalna reforma i socijalna zaštita na zapadnom Balkanu*. London and New York: Routledge.

<sup>3</sup> Kako je invazija Ruske federacije na Ukrajinu u vrijeme pisanja rada još uvijek u infantilnoj fazi razvoja, evidentnoj je da će i ova regija predstavljati značajne izazove takođe.

<sup>4</sup> „Zapadni Balkan“ nije formalno prepoznat kao politički ili međunarodni subjekt, no ipak je poznat i korišten radi lakšeg razumjevanja i djelovanja u regiji, između ostalog od strane Evropske unije koja izraz koristi kako bi implementirala jedinstven pristup u primjeni svojih instrumenata za izgradnju mira (ekonomskih, političkih, društvenih, razvojnih) sa ultimativnim ciljem da se države koje čine Zapadni Balkan pridruže Uniji.

<sup>5</sup> Službeni naziv: „Republika e Shqipërisë“

<sup>6</sup> U vremenskom periodu relevantnom za ovo poglavlje zvala se Republika Makedonija. Ime je promjenjeno 02.2019. godine.

<sup>7</sup> Disolucijom Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije Republika Srbija i Crna Gora su bile jedinstvena država koja se zvala Savezna Republika Jugoslavija od 27.04.1992. do 04.02.2003. godine, te Srbija i Crna Gora od 04.02.2003. godine do 03.06.2026. godine.

<sup>8</sup> Službeni naziv: „Republika e Kosovës“ i „Republika „Kosovo“. Kosovo nije univerzalno priznato kao država kako od strane susjednih država tako i od strane država članica EU i nije članom Ujedinjenih Naroda.

<sup>9</sup> Caplan, R. (2010): *The Western Balkans, On the Path to Stability*. u M. Cavelty Dunn i V. Mauer (ur.), *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, str. 359–368.

Ipak, neke zajedničke karakteristike, u većoj ili manjoj mjeri, se mogu prepoznati:

- radi se o dominantno post-konfliktnim društvima,
- usljed partikulariteta historijskog razvitka prisutan je relativno nizak nivo političke kulture<sup>10</sup>,
- mehanizmi demokratske vladavine i odlučivanja su relativno nerazvijeni,
- države Zapadnog Balkana značajno zaostaju za državama Centralne i Istočne Europe u procesima tranzicije,
- privreda je relativno nerazvijena te još uvijek disproportionalno fokusirana na I i II sektor a ekonomske performanse su niske,
- u državama u pitanju su u toku višestruke tranzicije:
  - iz rata u mir;
  - iz komunističke vladavine u višestranački demokratski sistem;
  - iz centralno-planske ekonomije u tržišnu ekonomiju<sup>11</sup>.

Slovenija i Hrvatska, stupanjem u članstvo Europske unije<sup>12</sup> iako tradicionalno i geografski pripadaju regiji Zapadnog Balkana, te su činile Socijalističku Federativnu Republiku Jugoslaviju, se sada smatraju geopolitički, i u veoma realnom smislu, da pripadaju Europskoj uniji pa tako ne čine Zapadni Balkan u kontekstu našeg rada, osim gdje je izričito drugačije naznačeno.

Krajem Hladnog rata i implementacijom značajnih, prvenstveno pozitivnih, promjena u političkim, privrednim i sigurnosnim aspektima u drugim dijelovima Europe (a posebno u onome što će postati „Europska unija“), Zapadni Balkan je, kontrastno, bio poprište destruktivnih konflikata, često opisanih kao „konflikti uslijed formiranja države“<sup>13</sup> te mahom negativnih političkih, privrednih i posebno sigurnosnih promjena.

Godine 1991., nakon pada bivšeg Sovjetskog saveza i završetka Hladnog rata, Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija je počela da sa disolucijom u individualne države koje su je sačinjavale. Proces disolucije je bio težak i

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<sup>10</sup> Petričušić, A. (2013): *Democracy without Citizens: Inadequate Consolidation in Two Decades of the Western Balkans Democracy*. European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities 2 (4), str. 34–54.

<sup>11</sup> Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V., J. Ker-Lindsay i D. Kostovicova (ur.) (2013): *Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans – New Perspectives on South-East Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>12</sup> Za Sloveniju 01.05.2004. godine i za Hrvatsku 01.07.2013. godine.

<sup>13</sup> Wallensteen, P. (2007): *Razumijevanje rješavanja konflikta – rat, mir i globalni sistem*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

problematičan te je rezultirao krvavim konfliktima između i unutar tri glavne etničke skupine – Srba, Bošnjaka i Hrvata – u više država a prvenstveno u Bosni i Hercegovini, Kosovu i Hrvatskoj. Nakon secesije svake pojedine teritorije SFRJ, vojne snage vođene Srbima a koristeći oružje bivše vojske SFRJ su napadale odcijepljene države. U narednih osam godina počinjeni su međunarodni zločini, uključujući zločine protiv čovječnosti i genocid u Srebrenici u Bosni i Hercegovini. Centralna obavještajna služba Sjedinjenih Američkih Država je izvijestila da je "90 posto" zločina počinjenih između juna 1991. i januara 1995. godine počinile srpske vojne i paravojne snage<sup>14</sup>.

Kao što je utvrđeno brojnim presudama Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKSJ) ali i presudom Međunarodnog suda pravde u Hagu, vojne snage Srpske etničke skupine uz finansijsku i drugu podršku Republike Srbije su počinili i genocid nad Bošnjačkim stanovništvom u Bosni i Hercegovini na području općine Srebrenica te višestruke čine etničkog čišćenja kao i mnogostruke ratne zločine. Etničke većine su u SFRJ živjele u miru za vrijeme dok je Josip Broz Tito vodio Jugoslaviju, shodno bilo bi razumno pretpostaviti da bi primjerena primjena mehanizama rješavanja konflikta mogla proizvesti učinak sprječavanja konflikta od eskalacije koja je nastupila.

UN, NATO i pojedinačne države gdje posebno izdvajamo Sjedinjene Američke Države, Veliku Britaniju i druge, su bili dovoljno obaviješteni te raspolagali su sa dovoljnim sredstvima da spriječe etničko čišćenje i, ultimativno, genocid u Srebrenici u Bosni i Hercegovini, ali su u osnovi odlučili da to ne učine<sup>15</sup>.

Faza „formiranja država“ koja je nastupila nakon raspada Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, je eskalirala u nasilje prvenstveno uzrokovano tradicionalnim tenzijama i netrpeljivostima konstituentnih naroda a, posmatrano na višem nivou apstrakcije uzrokovano nespojivim vizijama regionalnih političkih aktera o daljem razvoju novih političkih jedinica.

Manifestacijom postojećih ekstremnih nacionalističkih osjećanja, koja je, između ostalih, tipizirao i zastupao predsjednik Srbije Slobodan Milošević, prvo se odcijepila Slovenija, potom Hrvatska, a nedugo zatim i Bosna i Hercegovina dovodeći do disolucije SFRJ 27.04.1992. godine.

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<sup>14</sup> Power, S. (2002): *“A Problem from Hell”: America in the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books. str. 310.

<sup>15</sup> Rohde, D. (1997): *„End Game: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacres Since World War II“*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux

Međunarodna zajednica pa shodno i međunarodne organizacije su bila ili su morale biti svjesna Miloševićevih riječi i prijetnji, kao i straha koji su oni ulijevali bošnjačkom, hrvatskom, albanskom i drugom stanovništvu u Bosni i Hercegovini, Hrvatskoj, Kosovu ali i u drugim odcjepljenim državama SFRJ. Na vidjelo međunarodne zajednice su dolazili izvještaji te sve prominentniji fotografski i video dokazi brutalnih vojnih akcija koje su predominantno srpske trupe činile protiv bivših susjeda a novoproglašeni neprijatelja.

Konflikti u jugoistočnoj Evropi nastali pred kraj 20. stoljeća su doveli u pitanje postojeće mehanizme za prevenciju i rješavanje konflikta, za izgradnju mira te ukupni instrumentarij alata upravljanja konfliktima koje su do tada, u institucionalnim okvirima, razvile i koristile međunarodne organizacije. Uloge većine prominentnih međunarodnih organizacija u jugoslovenskoj krizi su bile definisane u uslovima Hladnog rata, a u to vreme njihova sigurnosna komponenta ili nije postojala (EZ) ili je njihova uloga tek trebala da bude definisana u posthladnoratovskom svijetu (NATO, KESS). Dakle, UN i njihova ograničena sredstva (embargo na oružje<sup>16</sup>, preventivna diplomatija, specijalni izaslanici, tradicionalno održavanje mira) bili su primarni instrumenti korišteni prije i nakon potpisivanja prvih mirovnih sporazuma (Sarajevski sporazum)<sup>17</sup>, s različitim uspjehom.

S druge strane, tadašnja kriza u nastajanju je dala poticaj međunarodnim organizacijama kojima su do tada nedostajali takvi alati i instrumenti da ih razviju, čini nam se u nekim instancama, *de nuovo*<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> Rezolucija Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a 713, Septembar, 1991.

<sup>17</sup> Sarajevski mirovni sporazum, potpisan 2. januara 1992. godine, bio je preduslov za uspostavljanje prve mirovne operacije u jugoslovenskoj krizi – UNPROFOR-a – čiji je mandat prvenstveno bio osmišljen za obuzdavanje konflikta koji je već bio u toku u Hrvatskoj i stvaranje uslova za mirne pregovore između strana u konfliktu. Vrlo brzo, njen mandat je proširen kako bi pokrio pogoršanje situacije u Bosni (april 1992.) i spriječio eskalaciju u Makedoniji (novembar 1992.).

<sup>18</sup> Anderson, S. (1995): *EU, NATO and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's New Security Architecture*. *European Security* 4 (2), str. 328–353.

## **2. Uloge međunarodnih organizacija**

Danas je poznato da ove četiri organizacije: Ujedinjene nacije, Europska unija, NATO savez i OSCE igraju glavnu ulogu u upravljanju konfliktima općenito, pri čemu su aktivnosti upravljanja konfliktima pozicionirane u kontekstu upravljanja sigurnošću. Kako Wagnsson i Holmberg objašnjavaju, proces razvoja mehanizama upravljanja u oblasti upravljanja konfliktima započeo je početkom 1990-ih i od tada je bio izvanredan. Paralelni razvoj diskursa i prakse doprinio je rastu struktura za multilateralno djelovanje u centralnim organizacijama kao što su UN, NATO i EU<sup>19</sup>.

Ovi akteri su i dalje prisutni i posebno aktivni u Bosni i Hercegovini. Njihova misija još uvijek se izvodi te, argumentovano, je ključna za opstanak pojedinih država u regionu, kao i za regionalnu sigurnost i stabilnost.

Organizacije u pitanju nastavljaju da primjenjuju mjere rješavanja konflikata i izgradnje mira. Shodno, regija Zapadnog Balkana može predstavljati zanimljivu studiju slučaja u nekoliko oblasti:

- proučavanje mirovne krize nakon Hladnog rata u periodu disolucije SFRJ;
- razvoja i evolucija mirovnih operacija Ujedinjenih Naroda prema mirovnim operacijama druge generacije; te
- djelotvornost primjene instrumentarija za rješavanje konflikata i izgradnju mira.

Nasilni i krvavi međusobni konflikti na Zapadnom Balkanu, a prvenstveno u Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu su izazvali veći interes, kako u pogođenim državama tako i u cijeloj međunarodnoj zajednici, za posredovanje kao sredstvo za podsticanje trajnih dogovora.

Složena sigurnosna situacija, jasni dokazi prominentnog kršenja ljudskih prava su indicirali od samog početka a svakako u ranim fazama nakon raspada Jugoslavije i onoga što se zvalo već u to vrijeme „jugoslovenskom krizom“ potrebu za aktivno djelovanje spoljnih aktera – prvenstveno međunarodnih udruženja i institucija.

Evidentno je da angažman međunarodnih organizacija u regiji nije izvršen toliko rano koliko je ukazivala hitnost situacije. Na osnovu analize deklasifikovanih dokumenata, Pauer (2002) tvrdi da „nijedna druga kampanja zločina u dvadesetom vijeku nije bila bolje praćena i shvatana od strane vlade SAD-a.

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<sup>19</sup> Wagnsson, C. i A. Holmberg (2014): *Conflict Management*. u J. Sperling (ur.), *Handbook of Governance and Security*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, str. 324–342.

Američki analitičari pripremali su za svoje nadređene detaljne i poražavajuće izvještaje o srpskim ciljevima i taktikama<sup>20</sup>. Ipak, svijet je u suštini gledao kako se užasni događaji odvijaju. “Uprkos nezapamćenom negodovanju javnosti zbog strane brutalnosti, Sjedinjene Američke Države, Europa i Ujedinjene nacije su naredne tri i po godine stajali po strani dok je oko dvije stotine hiljada Bosanaca ubijano, više od dva miliona raseljeno, a teritorija jedne multietničke europske republike podijeljena na tri etnički čiste države”<sup>21</sup>.

Razlozi za nepostupanje u korist žrtava bili su različiti od države do države i od organizacije do organizacije. To ne znači da u relevantnom vremenskom intervalu međunarodna zajednica nije učinila ništa. Ustvari, međunarodna zajednica i međunarodne organizacije su eventualno postale i nastavljaju biti duboko uključeni u pokušaj da se spriječi, izbjegne i koliko je to moguće smanji nasilje i konflikti u državama bivše Jugoslavije.

Tokom aktivnih oružanih konflikta oni su to učinili posredovanjem u prekidima vatre, uvođenjem sankcija i uspostavljanjem mirovnih sporazuma. Na samom početku krize, njihovi naponi u prevenciji konflikata bili su uglavnom neuspješni ili čak i nepostojeći<sup>22</sup>. Međunarodna zajednica, kao loše pripremljena, loše opremljena i bez političke volje, uvijek je činila „premalno i prekasno“ kako bi spriječila izbijanje nasilja ili zaustavila nasilje<sup>23</sup>.

Regionalne institucije kao što su Europska zajednica<sup>24</sup> i NATO, i njihovi tada postojeći konfliktno prevenirajući instrumenti, bili su neprikladni za rješavanje nastale krize na Zapadnom Balkanu jer su bili fokusirani na mehanizme primjene mirnih sredstava. Europska unija, koju je tada činilo 12 država članica i koja je u početku krize djelovala pod nazivom Europska zajednica, zajedno sa Ujedinjenim nacijama kao posrednikom, imala je značajnu ulogu vanjskog aktera koji je postavljao pravila međunarodnog priznavanja novih država nastalih raspadom SFRJ. No, pri tom dio problema se ima naći u tome što mišljenja država članica

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<sup>20</sup> Power, S. (2002): *“A Problem from Hell”: America in the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, str. 264.

<sup>21</sup> Power, S. (2002): *“A Problem from Hell”: America in the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, str. 251.

<sup>22</sup> Zupančić, R. (2009): *The Theory of Conflict Prevention. What Can Kosovo Draw out of it?* Thesis Kosova, 1/2009, str. 67.

<sup>23</sup> Marko, J. (2013): *Human Rights and Ethnopolitics*. U K. Cordell i S. Wolff (ur.), *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*. London and New York: Routledge, str. 236–248.

<sup>24</sup> U vrijeme krize institucija koju danas poznajemo kao Evropska unija se zvala Evropska zajednica. Evropska zajednica je supsumirana u Evropsku uniju 1993. godine.

EZ o priznavanju bivših republika SFRJ kao nezavisnih država su se znatno razlikovala od članice od članice<sup>25</sup>.

Neki autori idu i dalje tvrdeći da je nesposobnost razrade zajedničkih stavova među članicama EZ doprinijelo izbijanju nasilja na Zapadnom Balkanu i ograničila sposobnost EZ, a u manjem aspektu i drugih međunarodnih institucija da na odgovarajući način odgovori na nastajuće konflikte<sup>26</sup>.

Iako su neki poticaji EZ i instrumenti preventivne diplomatije, kao što je Badinterova arbitražna komisija<sup>27</sup>, uspješno implementirani u određenoj mjeri u ranoj fazi krize<sup>28</sup>, tokom prve polovine 1990-ih ni EZ ni NATO nisu imali razvijen poseban instrumentarij za upravljanje krizama, rješavanje konflikata i izgradnju mira izvan svojih država članica a što smatramo da je kriza u Zapadnom Balkanu posebno zahtjevala. Iako se može smatrati samim projektom prevencije konflikta, tek početkom 1990-ih godina EZ (EU) je poduzela konkretne korake da definiše i uspostavi svoju sigurnosnu komponentu i izgradi svoje kapacitete da postane pružalac sigurnosti u smislu kako europske tako i globalne sigurnosti. Ovo se također odnosi na njene kapacitete za prevenciju konflikata i izgradnju mira.

Posredovanje u okviru konferencije o Jugoslaviji pod vodstvom UN-a i EU bilo je potpuni neuspjeh argumentuje Joseph Marko, ukazujući na iskustvo u ratovima 1990tih u Bosni i Hercegovini i Hrvatskoj i ratu u Kosovu ranih 2000tih.

### **3. Izazovi u rješavanju konflikata**

Rješavanje međunarodnih konflikata postalo je raznovrsnije u smislu aktera u pitanju, primijenjenih mjera, okruženja u kojima su bile primijenjene, kao i sveukupnog pomaka sa paradigme usmjerene na državu ka paradigmi koja je više usmjerena na čovjeka.

U prvoj fazi jugoslovenske krize, između 1991. i 1999. godine, Ujedinjene nacije, Evropska unija, NATO i OSCE su koristili mješavinu pristupa i instrumenata kako bi se spriječila eskalacija krize u otvoreni konflikt (mislimo na mjere

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<sup>25</sup> Griffiths, M. i T. O'Callaghan (2002): *International Relations: Key Concepts*. London and New York: Routledge, str. 266.

<sup>26</sup> von Brabant, C. (1998): *Analysis and Advocacy on a European Policy on Conflict Prevention: A Viewpoint*. *Development in Practice* 8 (2), str. 217–220.

<sup>27</sup> Roth, B. (2015): *Ne-konsenzualna disolucija država u međunarodnom pravu: Inovacija Badinterove komisije u retrospektivi*, *Politička misao*, god. 52, br. 1, str. 48-78.

<sup>28</sup> Pellet, A. (1992): *The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of People*. *European Journal of International Law* 3 (1), str. 178–185.



sprječavanja konflikta) ili da bi se konflikti zaustavili kad je već do njih došlo (mislimo na mjere rješavanja konflikata).

U ovom periodu, angažman, prije svega UN-a i EU, ali i NATO-a i OSCE-a u državama u regionu je bio značajan. Tada, argumentovano, region Zapadnog Balkana je bio glavni fokus međunarodne pažnje i mjera za osiguranje međunarodne sigurnosti.

Opravdano je zaključiti da su jugoslovenska kriza i kasniji konflikti zapravo predstavljali idealan poligon za razvoj kapaciteta i instrumenata za rješavanje konflikata i izgradnju mira u okviru prvenstveno UN, NATO, EU i OSCE.

Iako smatramo da se ovaj postulat odnosi na četiri navedene organizacije podjednako, isti posebno važi za operacije ESDP-a<sup>29</sup> i mirovne misije UN-a<sup>30</sup>.

Opisujući takozvanu europsku sigurnosnu arhitekturu kao skup konkurentskih i kooperacijskih organizacija koje obavljaju različite uloge i zadatke, Cottey tvrdi da, iako postoji institucionalna konkurencija između EU, NATO-a i OSCE-a, postoji i element podjele rada između njih: NATO se fokusirao na zadatke vojne sigurnosti; EU se fokusirala na širu politiku političkog i ekonomskog angažmana sa partnerskim državama i drugim regijama; a OSCE se fokusirao na prevenciju/rješavanje konflikata i demokratiju i ljudska prava.<sup>31</sup>

Aktivnosti ovih višestrukih aktera bile su međusobno povezane i manje-više koordinirane u mnogim slučajevima od njihovog početnog angažmana u regionu. UN, EU, NATO i OSCE predstavljaju dominantne međunarodne institucije i organizacije na Zapadnom balkanu od početka konflikta te u subsekventnih 25+ godina.

Jugoslovensku krizu i djelovanje ovih međunarodnih organizacija u prevenciji možemo podjeliti na sljedeće faze:

1. početak raspada Jugoslavije kada je EZ putem mehanizama za prevenciju konflikata organizovala Mirovnu konferenciju o Jugoslaviji, pri čemu je Badinterova komisija uvela pravila za priznavanje novih država; istovremeno je EZ uvela moratorijum na proglašenje nezavisnosti, kao i embargo na oružje od

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<sup>29</sup> Gross, E. (2007): *Civilian and Military Missions in the Western Balkans*. U Emerson, M. i Gross, E. (ur.). *Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

<sup>30</sup> Beswick, D. i P. Jackson (2015): *Conflict, Security and Development – An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge.

<sup>31</sup> Cottey, A. (2014): *Europe*. U J. Sperling (ed.), *Handbook of Governance and Security*, str. 164–187.

strane UN-a<sup>32</sup>, prema odredbama poglavlja VII Povelje UN-a<sup>33</sup>. Ova faza spada u okviru transformacije konflikta i rješavanja konflikta, odnosno prve dvije faze u „modelu pješčanog sata“, u kojima dolazi do razlike, kontradikcije, polarizacije i konačno nasilja<sup>34</sup>. U smislu (direktne) prevencije konflikta, može se tvrditi da su ove akcije imale najosnovniju namjeru povezanu sa pokušajem suzbijanja konflikta, pronalaženjem rješenja koje je obostrano prihvatljivo za konfliktnu stranu i sprječavanjem izbijanja nasilja. Međutim, ove mjere su bile neuspješne i došlo je do nasilnog konflikta – prvo u Hrvatskoj (nakon kratkotrajnog konflikta u Sloveniji), a zatim u Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu;

2. početak konflikta u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini, kada su se diplomatski kapaciteti EU pokazali nedovoljni i nerazvijeni, otvorio je prostor za UN da uvede svoje instrumente u rasponu od tradicionalnog održavanja mira (UNPROFOR) do prevencije konflikta (UNPREDEP<sup>35</sup>; embargo na oružje). Ovo je središnji dio „modela pješčanog sata“, kada se koriste strategije ograničenja rata kako bi se konflikt geografski i u smislu intenziteta suzbio, te kako bi se konflikt prekinuo<sup>36</sup>, i konačno,

3. okončanje direktnog nasilja korištenjem mješavine mehanizama kao što su nametanje mira i prinudna diplomatija<sup>37</sup> kao i izgradnja mira od strane UN-a<sup>38</sup>. Ova faza obuhvata rješavanje konflikta i transformaciju konflikta kroz mješavinu očuvanja mira, stvaranja mira, strukturalne izgradnje mira, kao i kulturne izgradnje mira. Ove aktivnosti se također protežu na sljedeću fazu nakon 2000. godine.

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<sup>32</sup> Rezolucija 713 SB UN; SIPRI, 2007, xiii

<sup>33</sup> Povelja UN, Poglavlje VII: Član 41: za drugi uticaj embarga na oružje vidi izvještaj SIPRI/Uppsala Univerziteta od strane Fruchart, Holtom, Wezeman, Strandow i Wallenstein -a

<sup>34</sup> Ramsbotham, O., T. Woodhouse i H. Miall (2012): *Contemporary Conflict Resolution – The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press, str. 14.

<sup>35</sup> UNPREDEP u Republici Makedoniji predstavljao je prvo preventivno raspoređivanje mirovnih snaga UN-a (Ramcharan, B. G. (2011): *Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations*. UN Chronicle XLVII(2). Dostupno na <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/preventive-diplomacy-united-nations>)

<sup>36</sup> Ramcharan, B. G. (2011): *Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations*. UN Chronicle XLVII(2). Dostupno na <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/preventive-diplomacy-united-nations>.

<sup>37</sup> NATO bombardovanje položaja bosanskih Srba 1995. i njegovo bombardovanje Jugoslavije 1999.

<sup>38</sup> United Nations Transitional Authority In Eastern Slavonia, Baranja And Western Sirmium, trajala od Januara, 1996. godine do Januara, 1998. godine. Više: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untaes.htm>

Konflikt u regiji Zapadnog Balkana je jasan ukazatelj potrebe za koordiniranim djelovanjem i utilizacijom sredstava više vanjskih aktera kako bi se spriječio konflikt, ili, ukoliko to nije moguće kako bi se postigla tranzicija iz rata u mir.

Na Zapadnom Balkanu strane u konfliktu nisu bile spremne ili u mogućnosti da djeluju samostalno kako bi pronašle obostrano prihvatljiva i održiva rješenja. Kao što neki autori sugerišu, NATO, OSCE i drugi europski aranžmani djelovali su kao ambivalentni partneri na Zapadnom Balkanu i drugdje u Europi u periodu neposredno poslije Hladnog rata, a kasnije su djelovali kao zamjena za problematične odredbe o miru i sigurnosti iz poglavlja VII. Povelje UN-a<sup>39</sup>.

To je donekle pomoglo i u definisanju budućeg profila i uloge UN, EU, NATO i OSCE-a u regiji, kao i na podjelu zadataka primjene instrumenata sprječavanja konflikta i izgradnje mira među njima. Organizacije u pitanju su razvile značajno iskustvo i kapacitete po ovom pitanju izvodeći ovu institucionalnu koordinaciju od 1990-ih.

#### **4. Učinkovitost i kritike**

Početak 1990-ih ove su organizacije bile na prekretnici u definisanju parametara svog budućeg razvoja. Osim iskustava u Somaliji i Ruandi, neuspjeh tradicionalnog očuvanja mira u Bosni<sup>40</sup> poslužio je kao kritički podsjetnik na potrebu za inovacijama u alatima UN-a za očuvanje mira i sigurnosti. Posljedica ove potrebe bila je rekonceptualizacija pojma mirovnih operacija<sup>41</sup> uvedena kroz dokumente kao što su Agenda za mir<sup>42</sup> ili Brahimijev izvještaj. Počevši od ranih

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<sup>39</sup> Bennett, A. L. i J. K. Oliver (2004): *Međunarodne organizacije*. Zagreb: Politička kultura.

<sup>40</sup> Ramsbotham, O., T. Woodhouse i H. Miall (2012): *Contemporary Conflict Resolution – The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

<sup>41</sup> Bellamy, A. J., Williams, P. D. i S. Griffin, (2012): *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

<sup>42</sup> Agenda za mir (1992.), pokrenuta pod vodstvom glavnog sekretara Boutrosa Boutrosa Ghalija, bio je prvi konceptualni dokument nakon Hladnog rata u vezi s prevencijom i rješavanjem konflikata, uključujući održanje mira, koji je rezultirao jasnijim definicijama različitih oblika djelovanja dostupnih UN-u u postizanju svoje svrhe očuvanja mira i sigurnosti. Osim očuvanja mira, kao samo jednog od alata za prevenciju i rješavanje konflikata, tu su preventivna diplomacija, stvaranje mira i izgradnja mira. Značaj Boutros-Ghalijeve definicije nije u njenom tekstu (...), već u njezinoj široj konceptualizaciji, odnosno ideji da je održavanje mira jedan od nekoliko načina na koje treće strane mogu doprinijeti sprječavanju, rješavanju ili upravljanju nasilnim konfliktima i ponovnoj izgradnji zajednice nakon toga.

1990-ih, ove konceptualne promjene bile su popraćene promjenama u institucionalnoj strukturi s ciljem jačanja sposobnosti UN-a za prevenciju konflikata, rješavanje konflikata i izgradnju mira.<sup>43</sup>

Shvativši da su njezini kapaciteti nedovoljni da djeluje kao pružao sigurnosti, EU je počela definisati i graditi svoju sigurnosnu komponentu kako je predviđeno Ugovorom iz Maastrichta iz 1992. i dalje razvijeno u kasnijim ugovorima<sup>44</sup> te u Petersburškim zadacima iz 1993. godine

NATO tražeći opravdanje za svoje postojanje u odsustvu sovjetske prijetnje radi koje je osnovan je poduzeo preobražaj iz sredstva za pružanje kolektivne odbrane u tijelo kolektivne sigurnosti. Na Zapadnom Balkanu takozvane „operacije koje ne podpadaju pod Član 5“ ili „operacije izvan područja“ su ukazale na moguću budućnost ove organizacije. NATO je svojim djelovanjem osporio primat UN-a kao pružaoca legitimiteta za kolektivne akcije.

Ovo jasno proizilazi iz NATO-vog bombardovanja Jugoslavije 1999. u odsustvu odobrenja ili potpore UN-a barem u obliku rezolucije Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a<sup>45</sup>. Kao proizvod detanta, KESS<sup>46</sup> se transformisao u OSCE 1994. godine kada je organizacija dobila stalne strukture i procedure. S obzirom na članstvo, OSCE je mogao znatno teže da razvije snažnije instrumente sprječavanja konflikta i izgradnje mira slične onima u NATO-u i EU te značajno redukovane kapacitete da provodi i primjenjuje te instrumente. Tokom 1990-ih kapaciteti OSCE-a su se počeli razvijati u pravcu primjene mehanizama ranog upozoravanja, praćenja demokratskih procesa i implementacije mjera za izgradnju povjerenja, koje su ovoj organizaciji dale jedinstvenu i važnu ulogu prvenstveno u prevenciji konflikata i post-konfliktnoj izgradnji mira<sup>47</sup>.

Rješenja koja su implementirana u državama Zapadnog Balkana imala su povratni uticaj na razvoj politika dotičnih organizacija:

- UN - reforma očuvanja mira;
- NATO - poslijehladnoratovska uloga i zadaci upravljanja krizama,

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<sup>43</sup> Kao što je Odjel za mirovne operacije, Odjel za političke poslove, Odjel terenske podrške.

<sup>44</sup> Kao što su ugovori iz: St. Maloa, Amsterdama, Lisabona...

<sup>45</sup> Wagnsson, C. i A. Holmberg (2014): *Conflict Management*. u J. Sperling (ur.), *Handbook of Governance and Security*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 324–342.

<sup>46</sup> Konferencija za europsku sigurnost i suradnju, eng: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), prethodnik OSCE, osnovana 1973. godine.

<sup>47</sup> Alati OSCE-a pokrivaju čitav „ciklus konflikta“ – rano upozoravanje, prevenciju i rješavanje konflikta, upravljanje krizama i post-konfliktnu rehabilitaciju, što znači da su njegove aktivnosti osmišljene tako da mogu djelovati i reagovati u različitim fazama konfliktnih situacija (kroz Centar za prevenciju konflikta i terenske misije).

- EU - priroda EU operacija izgradnje mira i EU kao sigurnosni akter, i
- OSCE - nevojne operacije i izgradnja mira.

Iskustva ovih organizacija u Zapadnom Balkanu, zajedno sa iskustvima iz nekih drugih dijelova svijeta, postavila su temelje za detaljniju podjelu zadataka između istih, te poslužila kao polazna tačka za re-konceptualizaciju pojma suvereniteta u svjetlu pojave principa „odgovornosti za zaštitu“.

Dugotrajno prisustvo predstavnika međunarodne zajednice na Zapadnom Balkanu datira od početaka krize ranih 1990-ih godina i nastavlja se i danas. To donekle signalizira i krhkost međuetničkih odnosa na mikro nivou (unutar države), ali i na makro nivou (međudržavno).

Moguće je zamisliti da bi odsustvo djelovanja aktera međunarodne zajednice imalo ozbiljne implikacije na održivost implementiranih političkih i državnih struktura, posebno u Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu.

EU ali i međunarodna zajednica i dalje zadržava prisustvo svojih specijalnih predstavnika u ove dvije države.

Ured visokog predstavnika i dalje djeluje u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ovo nas upućuje na zaključak da rješenje konflikata, nominalno postignuto Dejtonskim sporazumom 1995. godine još uvijek nije dovelo do transformacije konflikta i željenog stepena stabilnosti između različitih zajednica u ovoj državi.

## **5. Zaključak i preporuke**

Zapadni Balkan i dalje ostaje regija gdje su potrebni kontinuirani naponi u rješavanju konflikata i izgradnji mira. Preporučuje se jača koordinacija između međunarodnih organizacija, veći naglasak na lokalne inicijative i potrebe, te razvoj inkluzivnijih političkih procesa koji mogu omogućiti trajnije rješenje postojećih problema. Također, potrebno je jačati ekonomske temelje regije kako bi se smanjila politička nestabilnost i omogućio održivi razvoj. Stoga, efikasnost budućih napora zahtijeva promišljene strategije i koherentne akcije, te predlažemo;

- **Jača koordinacija međunarodnih organizacija.** Koordinacija između međunarodnih aktera često pati od preklapanja inicijativa i nedostatka jasno definirane podjele uloga. Preporučuje se uspostava jasnijih mehanizama za koordinaciju, koji bi omogućili efikasnije upravljanje resursima, izbjegavanje redundancije i konflikata u mandatima te optimizaciju postignuća konkretnih ciljeva. Stvaranje zajedničkih platformi za planiranje i razmjenu informacija

moglo bi pomoći u identifikaciji prioriternih područja i usklađivanju političkih i razvojnih agendi.

- **Naglasak na lokalne inicijative i potrebe.** Unatoč značajnom prisustvu međunarodnih organizacija, lokalne inicijative često se osjećaju marginalizirano. Poticanje lokalnog vlasništva nad procesima izgradnje mira ključno je za održivost bilo kojih rješenja. To uključuje jačanje kapaciteta lokalnih vlada, nevladinih organizacija i zajednica u planiranju i provedbi projekata. Uključivanje lokalnih aktera u donošenje odluka ne samo da promiče transparentnost i povjerenje, već i osigurava da inicijative odgovaraju stvarnim potrebama i okolnostima.

- **Razvoj inkluzivnijih političkih procesa.** Politički procesi na Zapadnom Balkanu trebaju biti inkluzivniji kako bi se osiguralo da svi segmenti društva, uključujući manjinske i marginalizirane grupe, imaju glas u oblikovanju budućnosti svojih zajednica. To podrazumijeva reforme izbornih zakona, jačanje pravne države i borbu protiv korupcije. Također, potrebno je osigurati da se mirovni sporazumi i politička rješenja temelje na širokom konsenzusu i pravičnosti.

- **Jačanje ekonomskih temelja za smanjenje političke nestabilnosti.** Ekonomska nestabilnost je često katalizator političkih tenzija. Stoga je ključno usmjeriti resurse na ekonomski razvoj, koji uključuje unaprjeđenje infrastrukture, podršku malim i srednjim poduzećima, razvoj obrazovanja i stručne obuke te promicanje trgovine i investicija.

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**EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN  
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING IN THE WESTERN  
BALKANS**

*Review scientific paper*

Dr. Lejla Trnčić<sup>1</sup>

**Summary**

*The Western Balkans region, which includes countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, has long been considered one of the most unstable areas in Europe. The region has been the scene of numerous conflicts, especially after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. International organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have played key roles in attempts to resolve conflicts and build peace. This paper analyses their role, the challenges they have faced and the effectiveness of their interventions in the region.*

**Keywords:** *Western Balkans, International Organizations, Conflict Resolution, Peace Building, Efficiency.*

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<sup>1</sup> Association of Music Composers, Sarajevo

## **1. Western Balkans context**

In the context of the traditionally recognized borders of the European continent, the southeastern part of Europe is arguably considered the most demanding and potentially problematic <sup>2</sup>.

This is especially the case after World War II and the Cold War, which is also evident in the culmination of events in the region towards the end of the 20th century.

In the southeastern part of Europe, we believe that a convincing argument can be made that the most problematic part is what is traditionally called the "Balkan Peninsula" <sup>3</sup>.

Equally evident, in the context of the Balkan Peninsula, the region of the "Western Balkans" <sup>4</sup> is particularly problematic.

The Western Balkans consist of:

- Republic of Albania <sup>5</sup>,
- Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- Republic of North Macedonia <sup>6</sup>,
- Montenegro,
- Republic of Serbia <sup>7</sup>, and
- Republic of Kosovo <sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup>Bartlett, W. (2008): *Europe's Troubled Region: Economic Development, Institutional Reform and Social Protection in the Western Balkans*. London and New York: Routledge.

<sup>3</sup>As the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine at the time of writing is still in an infantile stage of development, it is evident that this region will present significant challenges as well.

<sup>4</sup>"Western Balkans" is not formally recognized as a political or international entity, but it is still known and used for easier understanding and action in the region, including by the European Union, which uses the term to implement a unified approach in the application of its peacebuilding instruments (economic, political, social, development) with the ultimate goal of the countries that make up the Western Balkans joining the Union.

<sup>5</sup>Official name: "Republika e Shqipërisë"

<sup>6</sup>During the time period relevant to this chapter, it was called the Republic of Macedonia. The name was changed in February 2019.

<sup>7</sup>With the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro was a single state called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from April 27, 1992 to February 4, 2003, and Serbia and Montenegro from February 4, 2003 to June 3, 2026.

<sup>8</sup>Official name: "Republika e Kosovës" and "Republika "Kosovo". Kosovo is not universally recognized as a state by either neighboring countries or EU member states and is not a member of the United Nations.

The political situation and characteristics of each constituent state of the Western Balkans differ significantly from one another <sup>9</sup>.

Nevertheless, some common characteristics, to a greater or lesser extent, can be recognized:

- these are predominantly post-conflict societies,
- Due to the particularities of historical development, there is a relatively low level of political culture <sup>10</sup>,
- the mechanisms of democratic governance and decision-making are relatively underdeveloped,
- the countries of the Western Balkans are significantly lagging behind the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the transition processes,
- the economy is relatively underdeveloped and still disproportionately focused on sectors I and II, and economic performance is low,
- multiple transitions are underway in the countries in question:
  - from war to peace;
  - from communist rule to a multi-party democratic system;
  - from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy <sup>11</sup>.

Slovenia and Croatia, upon joining the European Union, <sup>12</sup>although traditionally and geographically belonging to the Western Balkans region, and having formed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, are now considered geopolitically, and in a very real sense, to belong to the European Union and thus do not constitute the Western Balkans in the context of our work, except where explicitly stated otherwise.

With the end of the Cold War and the implementation of significant, primarily positive, changes in political, economic and security aspects in other parts of Europe (and especially in what would become the "European Union"), the Western Balkans, in contrast, was the scene of destructive conflicts, often

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<sup>9</sup>Caplan, R. (2010): *The Western Balkans, On the Path to Stability*. in M. Caveltly Dunn and V. Mauer (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, p. 359–368.

<sup>10</sup>Petričušić, A. (2013): *Democracy without Citizens: Inadequate Consolidation in Two Decades of the Western Balkans Democracy*. *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities* 2 (4), p. 34–54.

<sup>11</sup>Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V., J. Ker-Lindsay and D. Kostovicova (eds.) (2013): *Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans – New Perspectives on South-East Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>12</sup>For Slovenia 01.05.2004. year and for Croatia 01.07.2013. year.

described as "conflicts due to state formation" <sup>13</sup>and mostly negative political, economic and especially security changes.

In 1991, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began to dissolve into its constituent states. The process of dissolution was difficult and problematic, resulting in bloody conflicts between and within the three main ethnic groups – Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats – in several states, primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia. After the secession of each individual territory of the SFRY, military forces led by Serbs and using weapons from the former SFRY army attacked the breakaway states. Over the next eight years, international crimes were committed, including crimes against humanity and genocide in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United States Central Intelligence Agency reported that "90 percent" of the crimes committed between June 1991 and January 1995 were committed by Serbian military and paramilitary forces <sup>14</sup>.

As established by numerous judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and by the judgment of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, military forces of the Serbian ethnic group, with financial and other support from the Republic of Serbia, committed genocide against the Bosniak population in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Srebrenica municipality, as well as multiple acts of ethnic cleansing, as well as multiple war crimes. The ethnic majorities in the SFRY lived in peace during the time when Josip Broz Tito led Yugoslavia, so it would be reasonable to assume that the appropriate application of conflict resolution mechanisms could have the effect of preventing the conflict from escalating.

The UN, NATO and individual states, notably the United States, Great Britain and others, were sufficiently informed and had sufficient resources to prevent ethnic cleansing and, ultimately, genocide in Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they basically decided not to do so <sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup>Wallensteen, P. (2007): *Understanding Conflict Resolution – War, Peace and the Global System*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

<sup>14</sup>Power, S. (2002): *"A Problem from Hell": America in the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books. p. 310.

<sup>15</sup>Rohde, D. (1997): *"End Game: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacres Since World War II"*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux

The phase of "state formation" that occurred after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia escalated into violence primarily caused by traditional tensions and intolerances of the constituent peoples and, viewed at a higher level of abstraction, caused by incompatible visions of regional political actors on the further development of new political units.

As a manifestation of existing extreme nationalist sentiments, typified and represented by, among others, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, Slovenia first seceded, then Croatia, and shortly thereafter Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to the dissolution of the SFRY on April 27, 1992.

The international community and, accordingly, international organizations were or had to be aware of Milošević's words and threats, as well as the fear they instilled in the Bosniak, Croat, Albanian and other populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, and other breakaway states of the SFRY. Reports and increasingly prominent photographic and video evidence of brutal military actions by predominantly Serbian troops against former neighbors and newly declared enemies came to the attention of the international community.

The conflicts in Southeastern Europe that emerged towards the end of the 20th century challenged the existing mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, for peacebuilding, and the entire set of conflict management tools that had been developed and used by international organizations within institutional frameworks. The roles of most prominent international organizations in the Yugoslav crisis were defined in the context of the Cold War, and at that time their security component either did not exist (EC) or their role had yet to be defined in the post-Cold War world (NATO, CSCE). Thus, the UN and its limited means (arms embargo <sup>16</sup>, preventive diplomacy, special envoys, traditional peacekeeping) were the primary instruments used before and after the signing of the first peace agreements (Sarajevo Agreement) <sup>17</sup>, with varying degrees of success.

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<sup>16</sup>UN Security Council Resolution 713, September, 1991.

<sup>17</sup>The Sarajevo Peace Agreement, signed on 2 January 1992, was a precondition for the establishment of the first peacekeeping operation in the Yugoslav crisis – UNPROFOR – whose mandate was primarily designed to contain the conflict already underway in Croatia and create conditions for peaceful negotiations between the parties to the conflict. Very quickly, its mandate was expanded to cover the worsening situation in Bosnia (April 1992) and to prevent escalation in Macedonia (November 1992).

On the other hand, the then emerging crisis gave an impetus to international organizations that had previously lacked such tools and instruments to develop them, it seems to us in some instances, *de novo*<sup>18</sup>.

## **2. Roles of international organizations**

Today, it is recognized that these four organizations: the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and the OSCE play a major role in conflict management in general, with conflict management activities positioned within the context of security management. As Wagnsson and Holmberg explain, the process of developing governance mechanisms in the field of conflict management began in the early 1990s and has been remarkable since then. The parallel development of discourse and practice has contributed to the growth of structures for multilateral action in central organizations such as the UN, NATO and the EU<sup>19</sup>.

These actors are still present and particularly active in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their mission is still being carried out and, arguably, is crucial for the survival of individual states in the region, as well as for regional security and stability.

The organizations in question continue to implement conflict resolution and peacebuilding measures. Accordingly, the Western Balkans region can represent an interesting case study in several areas:

- studying the peace crisis after the Cold War during the period of the dissolution of the SFRY;
- the development and evolution of United Nations peacekeeping operations towards second-generation peacekeeping operations; and
- the effectiveness of the application of instruments for resolving conflicts and building peace.

Violent and bloody internecine conflicts in the Western Balkans, primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, have sparked greater interest, both in the

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<sup>18</sup>Anderson, S. (1995): *EU, NATO and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's New Security Architecture*. *European Security* 4 (2), p. 328–353.

<sup>19</sup>Wagnsson, C. and A. Holmberg (2014): *Conflict Management*. in J. Sperling (ed.), *Handbook of Governance and Security*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p. 324–342.

affected countries and in the entire international community, in mediation as a means of fostering lasting agreements.

The complex security situation, clear evidence of prominent human rights violations indicated from the very beginning, and certainly in the early stages after the breakup of Yugoslavia and what was already called the "Yugoslav crisis" at that time, the need for active action by external actors - primarily international associations and institutions.

It is evident that the involvement of international organizations in the region was not as early as the urgency of the situation would have indicated. Based on an analysis of declassified documents, Power (2002) argues that "no other campaign of atrocities in the twentieth century was better monitored and understood by the US government. American analysts prepared detailed and devastating reports on Serbian objectives and tactics for their superiors<sup>20</sup>." Yet the world essentially watched the horrific events unfold. "Despite unprecedented public outrage at foreign brutality, the United States, Europe, and the United Nations stood by for the next three and a half years while some two hundred thousand Bosnians were killed, more than two million displaced, and the territory of a multiethnic European republic was divided into three ethnically pure states<sup>21</sup>."

The reasons for not acting on behalf of the victims varied from state to state and from organization to organization. This does not mean that the international community did nothing during the relevant time period. In fact, the international community and international organizations eventually became and continue to be deeply involved in trying to prevent, avoid and, as far as possible, reduce violence and conflict in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

During active armed conflicts, they did so by brokering ceasefires, imposing sanctions and establishing peace agreements. At the very beginning of the crisis, their efforts in conflict prevention were mostly unsuccessful or even non-existent<sup>22</sup>. The international community, as ill-prepared, ill-equipped and without political

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<sup>20</sup>Power, S. (2002): *"A Problem from Hell": America in the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, p. 264.

<sup>21</sup>Power, S. (2002): *"A Problem from Hell": America in the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, p. 251.

<sup>22</sup>Zupančić, R. (2009): *The Theory of Conflict Prevention. What can Kosovo draw out of it?* Thesis of Kosovo, 1/2009, p. 67.

will, always did "too little too late" to prevent the outbreak of violence or to stop the violence<sup>23</sup>.

Regional institutions such as the European Community<sup>24</sup> and NATO, and their then existing conflict prevention instruments, were unsuitable for solving the resulting crisis in the Western Balkans because they were focused on the mechanisms of applying peaceful means. The European Union, which then consisted of 12 member states and which at the beginning of the crisis operated under the name of the European Community, together with the United Nations as a mediator, had a significant role as an external actor that set the rules for the international recognition of the new states created by the breakup of the SFRY. However, part of the problem can be found in the fact that the opinions of the EC member states regarding the recognition of the former republics of the SFRY as independent states differed considerably from member to member<sup>25</sup>.

Some authors go further, arguing that the inability to develop common positions among EU members contributed to the outbreak of violence in the Western Balkans and limited the ability of the EU, and to a lesser extent other international institutions, to respond appropriately to emerging conflicts<sup>26</sup>.

Although some EC initiatives and preventive diplomacy instruments, such as the Badinter Arbitration Commission<sup>27</sup>, were successfully implemented to some extent in the early stages of the crisis<sup>28</sup>, during the first half of the 1990s neither the EC nor NATO had developed a specific instrument for crisis management, conflict resolution and peacebuilding outside their member states, which we believe the crisis in the Western Balkans particularly required. Although it can be considered a conflict prevention project in itself, it was only in the early 1990s that the EC (EU) took concrete steps to define and establish its security component and build its capacity to become a security provider in terms of both European

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<sup>23</sup>Marko, J. (2013): *Human Rights and Ethnopolitics*. In K. Cordell and S. Wolff (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. London and New York: Routledge, p. 236–248.

<sup>24</sup>During the crisis, the institution we know today as the European Union was called the European Community. The European Community was subsumed into the European Union in 1993.

<sup>25</sup>Griffiths, M. and T. O'Callaghan (2002): *International Relations: Key Concepts*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 266.

<sup>26</sup>von Brabant, C. (1998): *Analysis and Advocacy on a European Policy on Conflict Prevention: A Viewpoint*. Development in Practice 8 (2), p. 217–220.

<sup>27</sup>Roth, B. (2015): *Non-consensual dissolution of states in international law: The innovation of the Badinter Commission in retrospect*, Political Thought, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 48–78.

<sup>28</sup>Pellet, A. (1992): *The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of People*. European Journal of International Law 3 (1), p. 178–185.



and global security. This also applies to its capacity for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The mediation at the UN-EU-led conference on Yugoslavia was a complete failure, argues Joseph Marko, pointing to the experience in the wars of the 1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and the war in Kosovo in the early 2000s.

### **3. Challenges in conflict resolution**

The resolution of international conflicts has become more diverse in terms of the actors involved, the measures applied, the environments in which they have been applied, and the overall shift from a state-centered paradigm to a more human-centered paradigm.

In the first phase of the Yugoslav crisis, between 1991 and 1999, the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and the OSCE used a mix of approaches and instruments to prevent the crisis from escalating into open conflict (meaning conflict prevention measures) or to stop conflicts once they had already occurred (meaning conflict resolution measures).

During this period, the engagement of primarily the UN and the EU, but also NATO and the OSCE in the countries of the region was significant. At that time, arguably, the Western Balkans region was the main focus of international attention and measures to ensure international security.

It is justified to conclude that the Yugoslav crisis and subsequent conflicts actually represented an ideal training ground for the development of capacities and instruments for conflict resolution and peacebuilding, primarily within the framework of the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE.

Although we believe that this postulate applies to the four mentioned organizations equally, it is especially valid for ESDP operations <sup>29</sup>and UN peacekeeping missions <sup>30</sup>.

Describing the so-called European security architecture as a set of competing and cooperating organizations performing different roles and tasks, Cottey argues that, although there is institutional competition between the EU, NATO and

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<sup>29</sup>Gross, E. (2007): *Civilian and Military Missions in the Western Balkans*. In Emerson, M. and Gross, E. (eds.). *Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans*. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies.

<sup>30</sup>Beswick, D. and P. Jackson (2015): *Conflict, Security and Development – An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge.

OSCE, there is also an element of division of labor between them: NATO has focused on tasks military security; the EU focused on a broader policy of political and economic engagement with partner countries and other regions; and the OSCE focused on conflict prevention/resolution and democracy and human rights.<sup>31</sup>

The activities of these multiple actors have been interconnected and more or less coordinated in many cases since their initial engagement in the region.

The UN, EU, NATO and OSCE have been the dominant international institutions and organisations in the Western Balkans since the beginning of the conflict and in the subsequent 25+ years.

The Yugoslav crisis and the activities of these international organizations in prevention can be divided into the following phases:

1. the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia when the EC, through conflict prevention mechanisms, organised the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, where the Badinter Commission introduced rules for the recognition of new states; at the same time, the EC introduced a moratorium on the declaration of independence, as well as an arms embargo by the UN<sup>32</sup>, under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter<sup>33</sup>. This phase falls within the framework of conflict transformation and conflict resolution, i.e. the first two phases in the “hourglass model”, in which difference, contradiction, polarisation and finally violence occur<sup>34</sup>. In terms of (direct) conflict prevention, it can be argued that these actions had the most basic intention associated with an attempt to suppress the conflict, find a solution that is mutually acceptable to the conflicting parties and prevent the outbreak of violence. However, these measures were unsuccessful and violent conflict broke out – first in Croatia (after a short-lived conflict in Slovenia), and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

2. the beginning of the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, when the diplomatic capacities of the EU proved insufficient and underdeveloped, opened up space for the UN to introduce its instruments ranging from traditional

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<sup>31</sup>Cottey, A. (2014): *Europe*. In J. Sperling (ed.), *Handbook of Governance and Security*, p. 164–187.

<sup>32</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 713; SIPRI, 2007, xiii

<sup>33</sup> UN Charter, Chapter VII: Article 41: for another impact of arms embargoes see the SIPRI/Uppsala University report by Fruchart, Holtom, Wezeman, Strandow and Wallenstein

<sup>34</sup> Ramsbotham, O., T. Woodhouse and H. Miall (2012): *Contemporary Conflict Resolution – The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 14.

peacekeeping (UNPROFOR) to conflict prevention (UNPREDEP<sup>35</sup>; arms embargo). This is the central part of the "hourglass model", when strategies of war limitation are used to reduce the conflict geographically and in terms of intensity, and to end the conflict<sup>36</sup>, and finally,

3. ending direct violence using a mix of mechanisms such as peace enforcement and coercive diplomacy<sup>37</sup> as well as UN peacebuilding<sup>38</sup>. This phase encompasses conflict resolution and conflict transformation through a mix of peacekeeping, peacemaking, structural peacebuilding, and cultural peacebuilding. These activities also extend to the next phase after 2000.

The conflict in the Western Balkans region is a clear indicator of the need for coordinated action and the utilization of resources by multiple external actors in order to prevent conflict, or, if that is not possible, to achieve a transition from war to peace.

In the Western Balkans, the parties to the conflict were not ready or able to act independently to find mutually acceptable and sustainable solutions. As some authors suggest, NATO, the OSCE and other European arrangements acted as ambivalent partners in the Western Balkans and elsewhere in Europe in the immediate post-Cold War period, and later acted as substitutes for the problematic peace and security provisions of Chapter VII. UN Charter<sup>39</sup>.

This has helped to some extent in defining the future profile and role of the UN, EU, NATO and OSCE in the region, as well as in dividing the tasks of implementing conflict prevention and peacebuilding instruments among them. The organizations in question have developed significant experience and capacities in this matter by carrying out this institutional coordination since the 1990s.

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<sup>35</sup>UNPREDEP in the Republic of Macedonia represented the first preventive deployment of UN peacekeeping forces (Ramcharan, BG (2011): *Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations*. UN Chronicle XLVII(2). Available at <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/preventive-diplomacy-united-nations>)

<sup>36</sup>Ramcharan, BG (2011): *Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations*. UN Chronicle XLVII(2). Available at <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/preventive-diplomacy-united-nations>.

<sup>37</sup> NATO's bombing of Bosnian Serb positions in 1995 and its bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999.

<sup>38</sup>United Nations Transitional Authority In Eastern Slavonia, Baranja And Western Sirmium, lasted from January 1996 to January 1998. More: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untaes.htm>

<sup>39</sup>Bennett, AL and JK Oliver (2004): *International Organizations*. Zagreb: Politička kultura.

#### 4. Effectiveness and criticism

In the early 1990s, these organizations were at a turning point in defining the parameters of their future development. In addition to the experiences in Somalia and Rwanda, the failure of traditional peacekeeping in Bosnia<sup>40</sup> served as a critical reminder of the need for innovation in the UN's tools for maintaining peace and security. This need led to a reconceptualization of the notion of peacekeeping operations,<sup>41</sup> introduced through documents such as the Agenda for Peace<sup>42</sup> or the Brahimi Report. Starting in the early 1990s, these conceptual changes were accompanied by changes in the institutional structure aimed at strengthening the UN's capacity for conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.<sup>43</sup>

Realizing that its capacities were insufficient to act as a security provider, the EU began to define and build its security component as envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and further developed in subsequent treaties<sup>44</sup> and in the Petersburg Tasks of 1993.

NATO, seeking justification for its existence in the absence of the Soviet threat for which it was founded, has undertaken a transformation from a means of collective defense to a collective security body. In the Western Balkans, so-called "non-Article 5 operations" or "out-of-area operations" have indicated a possible future for the organization. NATO's actions have challenged the primacy of the UN as a provider of legitimacy for collective action.

This is clearly evident from NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 in the absence of UN approval or support, at least in the form of a UN Security

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<sup>40</sup>Ramsbotham, O., T. Woodhouse and H. Miall (2012 ): *Contemporary Conflict Resolution – The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* . Cambridge: Polity Press.

<sup>41</sup>Bellamy, AJ, Williams, PD and S. Griffin, (2012): *Understanding Peacekeeping* . Cambridge: Polity Press.

<sup>42</sup>The Agenda for Peace (1992), launched under the leadership of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was the first post-Cold War conceptual document on conflict prevention and resolution, including peacekeeping, which resulted in clearer definitions of the various forms of action available to the UN in achieving its purpose of maintaining peace and security. In addition to peacekeeping, as just one tool for preventing and resolving conflicts, there are preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding. The significance of Boutros-Ghali's definition is not in its text (...), but in its broader conceptualization, namely the idea that peacekeeping is one of several ways in which third parties can contribute to preventing, resolving or managing violent conflicts and rebuilding communities afterwards.

<sup>43</sup>Such as Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs, Department of Field Support.

<sup>44</sup>Such as contracts from: St. Malo, Amsterdam, Lisbon...

Council resolution <sup>45</sup>. As a product of détente, the CSCE <sup>46</sup> was transformed into the OSCE in 1994 when the organization was given permanent structures and procedures. Given its membership, the OSCE was much more difficult to develop stronger conflict prevention and peacebuilding instruments similar to those of NATO and the EU, and had a significantly reduced capacity to implement and enforce these instruments. During the 1990s, the OSCE's capacities began to develop towards the application of early warning mechanisms, monitoring of democratic processes and the implementation of confidence-building measures, which gave the organization a unique and important role, primarily in conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding <sup>47</sup>.

The solutions implemented in the Western Balkan countries had a feedback effect on the development of the policies of the respective organizations:

- UN - peacekeeping reform;
- NATO - post-Cold War role and crisis management tasks,
- EU - the nature of EU peacebuilding operations and the EU as a security actor, and
- OSCE - non-military operations and peace building.

The experiences of these organizations in the Western Balkans, together with experiences from some other parts of the world, laid the foundation for a more detailed division of tasks between them, and served as a starting point for the re-conceptualization of the notion of sovereignty in light of the emergence of the principle of the “responsibility to protect”.

The long-term presence of international community representatives in the Western Balkans dates back to the beginning of the crisis in the early 1990s and continues today. This signals to some extent the fragility of interethnic relations at both the micro (within the state) and macro (between states) levels.

It is conceivable that the absence of action by international community actors would have serious implications for the sustainability of the implemented political and state structures, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

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<sup>45</sup> Wagnsson, C. and A. Holmberg (2014): *Conflict Management*. in J. Sperling (ed.), *Handbook of Governance and Security*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 324–342.

<sup>46</sup> Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), predecessor of the OSCE, founded in 1973.

<sup>47</sup> The OSCE's tools cover the entire "conflict cycle" - early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, meaning that its activities are designed to act and respond at different stages of conflict situations (through the Centre for Conflict Prevention conflict and field missions).

The EU and the international community continue to maintain the presence of their special representatives in these two countries.

The Office of the High Representative is still active in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This leads us to conclude that the conflict resolution, nominally achieved by the Dayton Agreement in 1995, has not yet led to the transformation of the conflict and the desired degree of stability between the different communities in this country.

## **5. Conclusion and recommendations**

The Western Balkans remains a region where continuous efforts are needed to resolve conflicts and build peace. Stronger coordination between international organizations, greater emphasis on local initiatives and needs, and the development of more inclusive political processes that can enable a more permanent solution to existing problems are recommended. Also, it is necessary to strengthen the economic foundations of the region in order to reduce political instability and enable sustainable development. Therefore, the effectiveness of future efforts requires thoughtful strategies and coherent actions, and we suggest;

- **Stronger coordination of international organizations.** Coordination between international actors often suffers from overlapping initiatives and a lack of clearly defined roles. It is recommended to establish clearer coordination mechanisms, which would enable more efficient resource management, avoid redundancy and conflicts in mandates, and optimize the achievement of specific objectives. The creation of common platforms for planning and information exchange could help identify priority areas and align political and development agendas.
- **Emphasis on local initiatives and needs.** Despite the significant presence of international organizations, local initiatives often feel marginalized. Encouraging local ownership of peacebuilding processes is critical to the sustainability of any solution. This includes strengthening the capacity of local governments, non-governmental organizations and communities in project planning and implementation. Involving local stakeholders in decision-making not only promotes transparency and trust, but also ensures that initiatives respond to real needs and circumstances.
- **Developing more inclusive political processes.** Political processes in the Western Balkans need to be more inclusive to ensure that all segments of society,

including minority and marginalized groups, have a voice in shaping the future of their communities. This includes reforming electoral laws, strengthening the rule of law, and fighting corruption. It is also necessary to ensure that peace agreements and political solutions are based on broad consensus and fairness.

- **Strengthening the economic foundations to reduce political instability.** Economic instability is often a catalyst for political tensions. It is therefore crucial to focus resources on economic development, which includes improving infrastructure, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, developing education and vocational training, and promoting trade and investment.

## 6. Literature:

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- 2) Bartlett, W. (2008): *Europe's Troubled Region: Economic Development, Institutional Reform and Social Protection in the Western Balkans* . London and New York: Routledge.
- 3) Bellamy, AJ, Williams, PD and S. Griffin, (2012): *Understanding Peacekeeping* . Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 4) Bennett, AL and JK Oliver (2004): *International Organizations* . Zagreb: Politička kultura.
- 5) Beswick, D. and P. Jackson (2015): *Conflict, Security and Development – An Introduction* . London and New York: Routledge.
- 6) Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V., J. Ker-Lindsay and D. Kostovicova (eds.) (2013): *Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans – New Perspectives on South-East Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 7) Caplan, R. (2010): *The Western Balkans, On the Path to Stability*. in M. Caveltly Dunn and V. Mauer (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, p. 359–368.
- 8) Cottey, A. (2014): *Europe* . In J. Sperling (ed.), *Handbook of Governance and Security*, p. 164–187.
- 9) Cottey, A. (2021). *European security architecture and the Western Balkans: Conflict, cooperation and coordination*. European Security.
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